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Considering the enormous influence Legal Realism has exercised upon
American law and legal education over the last sixty years, and
considering, too, as the clich6 has it, that "we are all realists now," it
remains surprising how inadequate-indeed inaccurate-most descriptions
of Realism turn out to be.
Ronald Dworkin, for example, claims that according to Realism,
"judges actually decide cases according to their own political or moral
tastes, and then choose an appropriate legal rule as a rationalization."'
* Joe A. Worsham Centennial Professor in Law and Professor of Philosophy, The University of
Texas at Austin. For valuable comments on earlier drafts of this essay or related material on Realism,
I am grateful to Steven Burton, Robert Clinton, Jules Coleman, Kent Greenawalt, Ken Kress, Douglas
Laycock, Alan Schwartz, Scott Shapiro, Charlie Silver, Jay Westbrook, and the participants in a faculty
workshop at the University of Iowa College of Law. For useful discussions about various aspects of
Realism, I also thank Hans Baade and Charles Alan Wright. I am indebted to the discussants of a
related paper on Realism at the Oxford-USC Legal Theory Institute at Oxford University in July 1995;
I can recall particular helpful comments or questions on that occasion from Joseph Raz, Richard
Warner, John Finnis, Jonathan Dancy, JonathanWolff, Marshall Cohen, Grant Lamond, Marty Levine,
David Slawson, and Michael Stocker. My colleagues in philosophy, Daniel Bonevac, Cory Juhl, and
Robert C. Koons, helped me in thinking about naturalism. Sheila Sokolowski and the editors of the
Texas Law Review offered useful suggestions on the penultimate draft. I am grateful to Matt Heffner,
Saul Laureles, and Stefan Sciaraffa for research assistance, and to Jonathan Pratter of UT's splendid
Tarlton Law Library for research support. Finally, it is a pleasure to thank Fred Schauer for
introducing me to Realism more than a decade ago.
1. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 3 (1977).
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Dworkin is echoed by Judge Jon Newman of the Second Circuit who
asserts that Realists believe that "the judge simply selects the result that
best comports with personal values and then enlists, sometimes brutally,
whatever doctrines arguably support the result." 2 John Hart Ely says the
Realists "'discovered' that judges were human and therefore were likely in
a variety of legal contexts consciously or unconsciously to slip their
personal values into their legal reasoning." 3 Steven Burton remarks that
it is often "claimed, in legal realist fashion, that judges decide whatever
they want to decide when the law is unclear (and it is often or always
unclear)."' Fred Schauer describes Realists as holding "that legal
decision-makers are largely unconstrained by forces external to their own
decision-making preferences." 5 And Robert Satter, a Connecticut trial
judge, says in a recent popular work that Realists "assert that a judge
exercises unbridled discretion in making decisions; he works backward
from conclusion to principles and uses principles only to rationalize his
conclusions. [Realists] consider the judge's values all-important." 6
Glosses on Realism like these are surely familiar to every student of
the literature. But it may help to recast them in a slightly more systematic
form to understand precisely what picture of Realism so powerfully grips
the legal imagination. According to what I will call the "Received View,"
Legal Realism is fundamentally: (1) a descriptive theory about the nature
of judicial decision, according to which, (2) judges exercise unfettered
discretion, in order (3) to reach results based on their personal tastes and
values, which (4) they then rationalize after-the-fact with appropriate legal
rules and reasons.
Like much "conventional wisdom," the Received View of Realism has
an element of truth: the core of Realism is, indeed, a certain sort of
descriptive claim about how judges decide cases, according to which judges
rationalize, after the fact, decisions reached on other grounds. But it is,
or so I shall argue, quite misleading to think of Realism as committed to
the claim that judges exercise "unfettered" discretion 7 or that they make
choices based on "personal" values and tastes. That Realism has been
saddled with these claims-what I shall call the claims of "Judicial
Volition" and "Judicial Idiosyncrasy"-has contributed in no small measure
2. Jon 0. Newman, Between Legal Realism and Neutral Principles: The Legitimacy of Institutional
Values, 72 CAL. L. REV. 200, 203 (1984).
3. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 44 (1980).
4. STEVEN J. BURTON, JUDGING IN GOOD FAITH 43 (1992).
5. FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES 191 (1991).
6. ROBERT SATTER, DOING JUSTICE: A TRIAL JUDGE AT WORK 64 (1990).
7. I use "unfettered" in Schauer's sense of being "unconstrained by forces external to their own
decision-making preferences." SCHAUER, supra note 5, at 191.
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to the frequent reduction of Realism to a whipping boy for legal common
sense.
8
As a preliminary matter, however, any talk about the core of
"Realism"-or even of "Realism" simpliciter-invites the objection that
there simply is no such thing: there is no doctrine of "Realism" as apart
from the views of individual writers.9 This sort of familiar skepticism is,
I think, largely false. For everyone commonly thought to be a Realist-
Karl Llewellyn, Jerome Frank, Underhill Moore, Felix Cohen, Leon
Green, Herman Oliphant, Walter Wheeler Cook, and Max Radin, among
others-endorses the following descriptive claim about adjudication: in
deciding cases, judges respond primarily to the stimulus of the facts. The
Received View can then be seen as simply one interpretation of certain
aspects of what I shall call this "Core Claim" of Realism, to which I return
below. 0
Indeed, I will suggest something further: that the misleading presenta-
tion of the Received View as the essence of Realism really represents what
we may call the "Frankification" of Realism, i.e., the now dominant
tendency to treat Jerome Frank's particular interpretation of the Core Claim
as identical to Realism." Even among Realists, of course, Frank's view
represented a particular sort of extreme-as Frank himself recognized. 2
Notwithstanding this, the Frankification of Realism, as evidenced by the
many quotations with which I began, has been the distinguishing feature of
Realism's long-term reception.' 3  But Frank is not Llewellyn or Moore
8. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 2, 2-3, 20, 393 (1995) (criticizing the
much-overblown movement" of Legal Realism for its reliance on nonlegal reasoning and lack of
method).
9. For one recent version of this skeptical view, see NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE 65 (1995) ("[Llegal realism 'is just a name. Like "chicken soup," it means what we
choose to call it.'" (quoting John Henry Schlegel, The Ten Thousand Dollar Question, 41 STAN. L.
REV. 435, 464 (1989) (book review))). On the difficulties with Duxbury's conception of
"jurisprudence" and of Legal Realism in particular, see Brian Leiter, Is There an "American"
Jurisprudence?, 17 OxFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 367 (1997).
10. See infra subpart II(A).
11. Some writers are even explicit about this identification. See, e.g., ANTHONY T. KRONMAN,
THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 186-209 (1993). For an unself-
conscious "Frankification" of Realism, see LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960,
at 6-8 (1986).
12. See Jerome Frank, Are Judges Human? (pt. 1), 80 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 22-23, 30 n.31 (1931).
13. These quotations may be usefully compared with the following apt summary of Frank's view:
[H]ow do judges decide cases? To Frank, they begin with the desired conclusion and
search for premises to substantiate it. Oriented to achieving certain results, judges
rationalize their decisions by finding facts and selecting rules that justify the desired
conclusion. By manipulating those facts and rules, judges enjoy unfettered discretion.
But what persuades judges to reach one conclusion rather than another? ... Most
important, according to Frank, are the "uniquely individual factors" that are the product
of the judge's "entire life-history."
2691997]
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or Oliphant, and while Frank shares in the Core Claim, none of these other
writers share in the Frankified Received View. In Part II of this paper, I
will set out the Core Claim of Realism and explore (as well as defend) its
differences from the Received View.
In Part III, I turn to broader questions of jurisprudence, in order to
locate Realism's place within it. Although Realism has had an undeniably
powerful impact upon American legal education and upon how lawyers and
judges think about what they do,' 4 it has had almost no impact upon the
mainstream of Anglo-American jurisprudence-the tradition running from
Bentham and Austin in the nineteenth century, to Dworkin and Raz in the
present. The cause of this neglect is clear: Hart's devastating critique of
the Realists in Chapter VII of The Concept of Law rendered Realism a
philosophical joke in the English-speaking world. 5 The Realists, on
Hart's reading, gave us a "Predictive Theory" of law, according to which
by the concept "law," we just mean a prediction of what the court will
do. 16  Hart easily demolished this Predictive Theory of Law. For
example, according to the Predictive Theory, a judge who sets out to
discover the "law" on some issue upon which she must render a decision
is really just trying to discover what she will do, since the "law" is
equivalent to a prediction of what she will do! These, and other manifestly
silly implications of the Predictive Theory, convinced most Anglo-
American legal philosophers that Realism was best forgotten.' 7
Yet Hart, as legal philosophers have gradually begun to
acknowledge,'" misread the Realists as answering philosophical questions
of conceptual analysis, questions about what particular concepts
("knowledge," "morally right," "law") mean-the questions that Hart him-
self was concerned to answer. But the Realists were not "ordinary
language" philosophers, and were not explicitly concerned with analyzing
Frank reveled in unfettered judicial discretion ...
ROBERT JEROME GLENNON, THE ICONOCLAST AS REFORMER: JEROME FRANK'S IMPACT ON AMERICAN
LAW 44-45 (1985) (quoting JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 106, 115 (1930)) (emphasis
in original). Note, in particular, the prominent place given to the themes of Judicial Volition and
Judicial Idiosyncrasy in this capsule summary of Frank's view. But as I argue below, it is not clear
that even Frank views judges as "unfettered." See infra note 66 and accompanying text.
14. For a brief survey, see Brian Leiter, Legal Realism, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN
ENCYCLOPEDIA (C.B. Gray ed., forthcoming 1998).
15. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 141-47 (1961).
16. The abbreviated discussion in the text is borrowed from Brian Leiter, Legal Realism, in A
COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 261,262-63 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996).
17. See, e.g., Michael S. Moore, The Need for a Theory of Legal Theories: Assessing Pragmatic
Instrumentalism, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 988, 1004 (1984); THEODORE BENDIT', LAW AS RULE AND
PRINCIPLE passim (1978).
18. See, e.g., JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JULES L. COLEMAN, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 35, 33-36
(Westview Press, Inc. rev. ed. 1990) (1984).
270 [Vol. 76:267
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the "concept" of law as it figures in everyday usage. Yet if we do not
view the Realists on the model of philosophy-as-conceptual-analysis, how
can we understand them as engaged in recognizably jurisprudential
inquiries? One possibility is to understand the Realists as forerunners of
the deconstructionism and postmodernism that has recently swept the
humanities-philosophy largely excepted. 19 Such an approach, embraced
by a number of writers associated more or less loosely with Critical Legal
Studies (CLS), 2 is unattractive on two counts: first, it does not help us
locate Realism within the questions and problems of jurisprudence;21 and
second, it seems to defeat the purpose of achieving a sympathetic philo-
sophical understanding of the Realists to see them simply as forerunners of
bad philosophy.22  Even more significant, though, is that the
"postmodern" misreadings of Realism turn out to be fatally anachronistic.
For the Realists, we must remember, came out of the intellectual culture
of the 1920s and 1930s in the United States, a culture firmly in the grips
of the world-view to which postmodernists are now reacting: a world-view
which considered natural science the paradigm of all genuine knowledge,
19. See infra notes 22, 93.
20. See, e.g., Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1152 (1985).
21. On these, see Leiter, supra note 9, at 370-71.
22. The generally low philosophical level of "postmodern" scholarship has been the subject of
much discussion recently, in the wake of the "Sokal Affair." Alan Sokal, a physicist, wrote a parody
of postmodern scholarship, full of postmodern slogans and nonsensical science. The article was then
accepted by and published in a trendy cultural studies journal, Social Text. Alan Sokal, Transgressing
the Boundaries: Toward a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity, SOC. TExT, Spring-
Summer 1996, at 217. For a brief overview, see Alan Sokal, A Physicist Experiments with Cultural
Studies, LINGUA FRANCA, May-June 1996, at 62, 62-63. The significance of this hoax is well-put by
two prominent philosophers:
The central issue raised by Alan Sokal's hoax ... [is] the competence with which ...
[cultural] studies are conducted ....
For many years now, academics from a variety of disciplines have been grumbling
... about the appallingly low standards of argument and evidence that appear to
characterize work in this area .... As philosophers.., we have often been struck by
the sloppy and naive quality of what passes for philosophical argument ... and at the
central role that such argument has been made to play.
Paul Boghossian & Thomas Nagel, Letter to the Editor, LINGUA FRANCA, July-Aug. 1996, at 58, 58,
58-60. After giving an example from Sokal's piece, they observe, correctly, that,
Only the complete scientific, mathematical, and philosophical incompetence of the editors
of Social Text can explain how they were able to accept for publication such a tissue of
transparent nonsense.
... [Iln accepting Sokal's parody, these [postmodern] scholars have made it clear
that.., they are unable to tell the difference between a statement that no sane person
could credit and its opposite.
Id. at 59-60. (As William Forbath points out to me, putatively "left" legal academics are over-
whelmingly caught up in postmodemism. But as Sokal observes, "a scientific worldview, based on a
commitment to logic and standards of evidence and to the incessant confrontation of theories with
reality, is an essential component of any progressive politics." Alan Sokal Replies, LINGUA FRANCA,
July-Aug. 1996, at 57, 57; see also infra note 93.)
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distinguished by its methods of observation and empirical testing, and in
which the social sciences aimed to emulate the natural sciences' methods
and successes. Any plausible account of Realist jurisprudence cannot lose
sight of this intellectual background.
Yet there has been more to the CLS reinvention of the Realists than
the implausible reading of them as proto-postmodernists.1 In fact, two
other themes have been quite prominent in the literature. First, CLS
brought the economist Robert Hale, a marginal figure in the Realist
movement, 24 to the center of its picture of Legal Realism. Yet whatever
Hale's importance and interest in his own right, he simply had nothing to
contribute to the Realists' central jurisprudential concern with the theory
of judicial decisionmaking.1 Hale's crowning achievement, as CLS pre-
sents it, is instead supposed to be a decisive argument against the public-
private distinction.' In its contemporary form,' the argument typically
runs as follows:
Since it is governmental decisions that create and structure the so-
called "private" sphere (e.g., by creating and enforcing a regime of
23. See, e.g., MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960, at
193-268 (1992); J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First
Amendment, 1990 DUKEL.J. 375,379-83; Peller, supra note 20; Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism
Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 465, 465 (1988) (reviewing KALMAN, supra note 11). Also illuminating in this
regard are the introductory essays and editorial selections in AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM (William W.
Fisher III et al. eds., 1993), a volume that views Realism through a CLS lens.
24. Milton Handler-himself an early Realist, professor at Columbia from 1927 to 1972, and a
friend and colleague of both Hale and Llewellyn-has remarked regarding Hale that, "he carried very
little influence with his colleagues .... I'm amazed now to find him regarded as one of the great
Legal Realists." Memorandum from Milton Handler to Brian Leiter 12 (Apr. 27, 1995) (on file with
author). Karl Llewellyn identifies Handler as a Realist in A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step,
30 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 454 & n.22 (1930) and in Some RealismAbout Realism-Responding to Dean
Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1237, 1240 n.42, 1244 n.55, 1245 (1931) [hereinafter Llewellyn,
Some Realism About Realism].
25. I take it to be uncontroversial that the Realists were centrally concerned with what judges do.
See, e.g., EDWIN W. PATTERSON, JURISPRUDENCE: MEN AND IDEAS OF THE LAW 541 (1953) ("The
leading realists centered upon the judicial process."). The Realists, to be sure, also express interest
in understanding the effects of legal rules in the real world, but this aspect of Realism does not, as I
see it, bear on any recognizably jurisprudential questions. This concern of the Realists has been, in
some ways, inherited by economic writers on law, especially institutional economists. For a useful
overview, see OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, REVISITING LEGAL REALISM: THE LAW, ECONOMICS, AND
ORGANIZATION PERSPECTIVE (University of Cal. Berkley Program in Law and Econ. Working Paper
No. 95-12, 1996).
26. The argument is typically attributed to Hale and to the philosopher Morris Cohen-the latter
being better known as a critic of Realism! For the relevant papers, see Morris R. Cohen, Property and
Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927), reprinted in AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, supra note 23, at
109 and Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI.
Q. 470 (1923), reprinted in AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, supra note 23, at 101.
27. The CLS reinvention of Realism has been so successful that even non-CLS scholars have taken
up these putatively "Realist" arguments. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM.
L. REV. 873, 917-19 (1987).
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property rights), there should be no presumption of "non-
interference" in this "private" realm (e.g., the marketplace) because
it is, in essence, a public creature. There is, in short, no natural
baseline beyond which government action becomes "interventionist"
and non-neutral, because the baseline itself is an artifact of
government regulation.'
Unfortunately, this influential (and no doubt familiar) argument is based on
a blatant non-sequitur. From the fact that a "private" realm is a creature
of government regulation it does not follow that government action in that
realm is normatively indistinguishable from government action in the
"public" realm: for the key issue is the normative justification for drawing
the baseline itself, not simply the fact that one has been drawn by an
exercise of public power. If the underlying normative reasons for drawing
the baseline are sound (e.g., for demarcating a realm of "private"
transactions), then these reasons provide an argument against intervention.
That the "private" sphere is an artifact of government regulation is of no
relevance.
Second, CLS writers have frequently enlisted the Realists as authority
for the CLS claim that the law is indeterminate.29 In so doing, they have
introduced two important distortions of Realist jurisprudence. First, the
Realists, unlike the CLS writers, did not generally view the law as
"globally" indeterminate, 30 that is, as indeterminate in all cases. To the
contrary, Realists were mainly concerned to point out the indeterminacy
that exists in those cases that are actually litigated, especially those that
make it to the stage of appellate review-a far smaller class of cases, and
one where indeterminacy in law is far less surprising.3' Second, the
Realists based their argument for indeterminacy in law primarily on the
existence of conflicting, but equally legitimate, interpretive methods: e.g.,
conflicting ways of reading statutes, or of construing precedents.3 2
28. This is my summary of the argument. For similar incarnations of this argument, see Balkin,
supra note 23, at 380-81 (recognizing that the government's protection of racist speech in turn infringes
on the rights of minorities to be free from racial oppression); Singer, supra note 23, at 487-91
(recognizing that the government's role in creating and enforcing property rights in turn creates power
relationships among market participants); and Sunstein, supra note 27, at 875.
29. For examples of this approach, see the sources cited supra note 23 and infra notes 33-34.
30. For more on the terminology and conceptualization here, see Brian Leiter, Legal
Indeterminacy, 1 LEGAL THEORY 481 (1995).
31. See, e.g., Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism, supra note 24, at 1239 ("[ln any case
doubtful enough to make litigation respectable the available authoritative premises ... are at least two,
and ... the two are mutually contradictory as applied to the case at hand."); Max Radin, In Defense
of an Unsystematic Science of Law, 51 YALE L.J. 1269, 1271 (1942) ("[Judicial] [d]ecisions will
consequently be called for chiefly in what may be called marginal cases, in which prognosis is difficult
and uncertain. It is this fact that makes the entire body of legal judgments seem less stable than it
really is.").
32. See, for example, Llewellyn's seminal discussion of the "strict" and "loose" views of
precedent in K.N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 72-75 (1930), and his treatment of the conflicting
1997]
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Because statutes or cases could be read in two ways, a statute or case could
generate at least two different rules. Thus, even an honest application of
the "methods" of legal reasoning and interpretation would fail to determine
as a matter of law a unique decision. The CLS writers, by contrast, have
tended to locate the source of legal indeterminacy either-loosely following
Derrida and Wittgenstein-in general features of language itself,33 or-
loosely following Hegel via Lukdcs via Unger-in conflicting moral and
political principles that purportedly exist beneath the surface of the law, at
some suitable level of abstraction.' The Realists made distinctively law-
yerly arguments for legal indeterminacy, while CLS writers have relied on
more explicitly philosophical considerations-though often they have mis-
understood these considerations.3 1
If, then, we are indeed "all Realists now," this is a royal "we" that
manifestly does not include legal philosophers. Within Anglo-American
jurisprudence, Realism remains a joke, viewed simply as a movement that
appealed to philosophically superficial lawyers, but which made no substan-
tial contribution to philosophical thinking about law.36 Outside Anglo-
American jurisprudence, meanwhile, legal theorists have selectively
represented-or simply mispresented-Realism, and in ways that do not
bode well for understanding the Realists as offering anything to a philo-
sophical theory of law.
Thus our situation today: Realism is omnipresent in American law
schools and legal culture, but almost entirely absent from serious legal
philosophy. It is the aim of this Article to change that situation. I hope
to show that the Realists laid the foundation for a jurisprudence distin-
guished by two novel philosophical commitments: naturalism and
pragmatism. Naturalism is an unfamiliar term in the jurisprudential uni-
verse (though not, as I note, elsewhere in philosophy). Pragmatism, by
"canons of statutory construction" in Karl Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and
the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395,399-406 (1950).
33. See, e.g., Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J.
997, 1007-09 (1985); Peller, supra note 20, at 1160 n.6 & 1161; Girardeau A. Spann, Deconstructing
the Legislative Veto, 68 MINN. L. REV. 473, 536-37 (1984).
This position should be distinguished from that of Hart, who finds indeterminacy in the "open
texture" of language. See HART, supra note 15, at 124. But this focus means that Hart, too, never
actually engages the arguments for indeterminacy most important to the Realists.
34. For examples of these arguments for indeterminacy, see generally ROBERTO MANGABEIRA
UNGER, THE CRITIcAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 109-17 (1986); Duncan Kennedy, Form and
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Peller, supra note 20; Mark
V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96
HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983). On the intellectual pedigree of this argument, see Leiter, supra note 9,
at 383-84.
35. For a representative critique, see Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, Determinacy, Objectivity,
and Authority, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 549 (1993).
36. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
274 [Vol. 76:267
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contrast, is much talked about, but, I argue, poorly understood, especially
as it applies to Realism. A naturalized jurisprudence predicated on a
pragmatic outlook-in the precise sense with which I will be concerned-
will turn out to be the real Realist legacy in legal philosophy.
A final methodological caveat bears noting. I regard what I am doing
here as a philosophical reconstruction of Legal Realism. The Realists
themselves were often badly confused about philosophical matters, which
accounts, in part, for their sorry reputation among legal philosophers.
Nonetheless, they had genuine insight into law and adjudication-more than
most legal philosophers-and these insights reflect a philosophical sensibil-
ity of sorts. This Article tries to reconstruct and defend this sensibility.
Such an account has been sorely missing from the literature on Realism.37
While we now have a rich variety of historical materials on Realism,38
there has been no sympathetic interpretation of Realism from a philosoph-
ical perspective. A philosophical interpretation of Realism will, of course,
require us to sift through the mass of Realist writings, in order to produce
a theory of law worthy of philosophical attention. This theory-what I call
a "naturalized jurisprudence"-is one that remains, I hope to show, recog-
nizably Realistic in spirit, if not in all its details.
II. The Real Legal Realism
A. The Core Claim
The Core Claim of Legal Realism consists of the following descriptive
thesis about judicial decision-making: judges respond primarily to the
stimulus of facts.39  Put less formally-but also somewhat less
accurately-the Core Claim of Realism is that judges reach decisions based
on what they think would be fair on the facts of the case, rather than on the
basis of the applicable rules of law.'
37. Robert Summers tried, I think, to produce such an account in his INSTRUMENTALISM AND
AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY (1982), but his book has had little impact on Anglo-American legal
philosophy. Some of the reasons for this are persuasively set out in Moore, supra note 17 (reviewing
SUMMERS, supra). In a nutshell: Summers never gives an adequate defense of the Realist turn to
descriptive, empirical theory as a jurisprudential undertaking.
38. See, e.g., DUXBURY, supra note 9; KALMAN, supra note 11; JOHN HENRY SCH-LEGEL,
AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE (1995); WILLIAM TWINING, KARL
LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT (1973); G. EDWARD WHITE, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN
LEGAL THOUGHT (1978).
39. Proper emphasis must be put on the word "primarily": no Realists (except perhaps Underhill
Moore) claimed that rules never mattered to the course of decision. See Leiter, Legal Realism, supra
note 16, at 268; infra note 56.
40. Obviously, an applicable rule of law makes certain facts relevant, and thus even a judge who
is following the legal rule must take these facts into account. Conversely, a judge must first look at
the facts to see which legal rules are relevant. But this is a plainly trivial sense of fact-responsiveness.
The Realist idea is that judges are responding to the underlying facts of the case, facts that are not made
relevant by any legal rule. A useful statement of the point comes from the eminent UCC scholar James
1997]
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It is possible to find some version of the Core Claim in the writings
of all the major Realists. Oliphant, for example, gives us an admirably
succinct statement; he says that courts "respond to the stimulus of the facts
in the concrete cases before them rather than to the stimulus of over-
general and outworn abstractions in opinions and treatises."" Oliphant's
claim was confirmed by Judge Hutcheson's admission that "the vital,
motivating impulse for the decision is an intuitive sense of what is right or
wrong for that cause."42  Similarly, Jerome Frank cited "a great
American judge," Chancellor Kent, who confessed that, "He first made
himself 'master of the facts.' Then (he wrote) 'I saw where justice lay,
and the moral sense decided the court half the time; I then sat down to
search the authorities . . . but I almost always found principles suited to
my view of the case . . . . "' Precisely the same view of what judges
really do when they decide cases is presupposed in Llewellyn's advice to
lawyers that, while they must provide the court "a technical ladder" justify-
ing the result, what the lawyer must really do is "on the facts ... persuade
the court your case is sound."' As Frank pointed out, the very same
advice had been offered by a former president of the American Bar
Association.45
J. White, discussing what he correctly calls "the central tenet" of the Realist Movement, namely that
"judges' decisions arise not merely from the rules they state in their opinions, but at least as much from
unstated reasons-from the facts before them, from the expectation of the parties in the trade, and from
the judges' own judgment about fairness." James J. White, The Influence of American Legal Realism
on Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, in PRESCRIPTIVE FORMALITY AND NORMATIVE
RATONALITY IN MODERN LEGAL SYSTEMS 401, 401 (Werner Krawietz et al. eds., 1994). In fact, I
argue below, it was the dominant view among Realists that, at least in commercial disputes, what
judges thought was fair on the facts tracked "the expectation of the parties in the trade." See infra text
accompanying note 53.
41. Herman Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.A. J. 71, 75 (1928).
42. Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial
Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274, 285 (1929).
43. FRANK, supra note 13, at 104 n.* (1930) (emphasis omitted) (quoting a personal letter from
Chancellor Kent).
44. LLEWELLYN, supra note 32, at 76. This point is surely familiar to all litigators. When I
wrote my first brief straight out of law school, the older litigator on the case put it to me (roughly) this
way: "Cases are won or lost on the facts section of the brief. By the time the judge finishes the facts,
you want him to think our client was screwed, and that fairness and justice dictate a decision for us.
The law section of the brief just gives the judge a place to hang his hat." It is no small virtue of the
Realists' Core Claim that it captures what every practicing lawyer knows.
45. FRANK, supra note 13, at 102 n.* (referring to comments made by S.S. Gregory). For a more
recent statement of a similar point, see Sam Sparks, Tribute to the Honorable Homer Thornberry, 74
TEXAS L. REV. 949, 949-50 (1996) (describing the late Judge Thornberry of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit as having "a strong sense of what was 'right' and what was 'wrong.' When it
appeared to the judge that the law presented a hurdle to what he thought was the fair and right thing
to be done, he would struggle with this dilemma and argue with his law clerks or fellow judges until
he was satisfied that his personal decision was both consistent with the law and the most fair
determination under the circumstances.").
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Especially at the appellate level, Llewellyn maintained that one had to
understand "how far the proposition which seems so abstract has roots in
what seems to be the due thing on the facts [before the court]."'" Later
on, Llewellyn would speak of "the fact-pressures of the cases"47 and of
"the sense of the situation as seen by the court"' as determining the
outcome. Although the notion of the "situation-sense" was rendered cryp-
tic by the later Llewellyn, who located it in a new cognitive "faculty"
capable of detecting "immanent laws," 49 it began life in Realist thought
as a sensible and naturalistically respectable' phenomenon. Thus, Max
Radin, in keeping with the Core Claim, suggested that the decision of a
judge was determined by "a type situation that has somehow been early
called up in his mind."'" Type situations were simply "the standard
transactions with their regulatory incidents[, which] are familiar ones to
[the judge] because of his experience as a citizen and a lawyer."52 We
explain, in other words, the judge's "sense" of a particular situation by
reference to the relevant psycho-social facts about the judge's professional
and social history: by his having encountered such situations, say, in his
prior practice as a corporate litigator and his having formed, accordingly,
certain characteristic assumptions about what is right and fair in such
circumstances, based in significant part on his familiarity with the local
norms of conduct in that trade or practice. Judges are fact-responsive, and
the facts, for Radin and Llewellyn, present themselves in ways that reflect
what we might call the "sociological" profile of the judge.
The Realists, then, share a commitment to the view that in deciding
cases, judges respond primarily to the stimulus of the facts of the case.
Note, now, two points about this way of formulating the Core Claim.
First, the contrasting view here-usually dubbed "Formalism"-is
committed to the descriptive claim that judges respond primarily-indeed,
46. LLEWELLYN, supra note 32, at 29.
47. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism, supra note 24, at 1243; cf KARL N. LLEWELLYN,
THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 122 (1960) (discussing "the differential impact of the facts of the
individual case and the facts of the situation taken as a type").
48. Llewellyn, supra note 32, at 397.
49. LLEWELLYN, supra note 47, at 122. For discussion, see Brian Leiter, supra note 16, at 272-
74. For a more sympathetic reading of the later Llewellyn, see KRONMAN, supra note 11, at 209-25.
50. A naturalistically respectable faculty or property is one that has a place in the explanatory
theories of successful natural and social sciences. For more on naturalism, see the discussion infra
subpart HI(B).
51. Max Radin, The Theory of Judicial Decision: Or How Judges Think, 11 A.B.A. J. 357, 362
(1925).
52. Id. at 358. A similar notion was developed at length by Underhill Moore in a series of papers
in the late 1920s and early 1930s. See, e.g., Underhill Moore & Theodore Hope, Jr., An Institutional
Approach to the Law of Commercial Banking, 38 YALE L.J. 703, 705 (1929) (analyzing "the relation
between judicial behavior and institutional... ways of behaving... in the contemporary culture of
the place where the facts happened and the decision was made").
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perhaps exclusively-to the rational demands of the applicable rules of law
and modes of legal reasoning. 3 We can gloss the Formalist's descriptive
claim as saying that judges are (primarily) rule-responsive, while the
Realist claims that judges are (primarily) fact-responsive. 4
This gloss is potentially misleading in one respect. What the descrip-
tive Formalist really claims is that judges are (primarily) responsive to
legal reasons, while the Realist claims that judges are (primarily) respon-
sive to nonlegal reasons. This point is obvious enough in the case of the
Formalist picture: statutes, precedents, and deductive inferences all give
judges legal reasons for deciding one way rather than another.55 But
when a judge responds to the underlying facts of the case, what we are
really saying is that the judge has nonlegal reasons-e.g., "I think it
wouldn't be fair to penalize the defendant here"-for deciding the way she
does.5 6 The real dispute between the Formalist and the Realist then con-
cerns whether the reasons that determine judicial decision are primarily
legal reasons or nonlegal reasons.5 This means, of course, that this
dispute presupposes a way of demarcating legal reasons from nonlegal
ones. 8 We shall have to revisit these issues below in discussing the
naturalism of the Realists.
A second preliminary point, however, about my formulation of the
Core Claim requires comment. My formulation invokes (intentionally, of
course) the language of behaviorism, the dominant movement in psychol-
ogy at the time the Realists were writing. According to the behaviorist, all
human behavior can be explained in terms of the pairings of certain
53. The applicable legal rules also make certain facts relevant and thus require judges to respond
to them; but this, of course, is a trivial sense of fact-responsiveness that no one denies. See supra note
40.
54. "Formalism" can also name a normative view, to the effect that judges ought to be primarily
rule- and legal-reason-responsive. Theories of adjudication, of course, typically make both descriptive
and normative claims. See Brian Leiter, Heidegger and the Theory of Adjudication, 106 YALE L.J.
253, 255-58 (1996).
55. For a more precise characterization of the "Class of Legal Reasons," see Leiter, supra note
30, at 481 (describing the components of the class of legal reasons).
56. The only Realist who would deny this would have been Underhill Moore, who took behavior-
ism in psychology more seriously than other Realists. For the behaviorist, of course, the mind is a
black box, not to be invoked in explaining behavior. Thus, reasons are only relevant as certain types
of (aural, visual) stimuli, but are not relevant in virtue of their rational content or meaning! "A
proposition of law," says Moore, "is nothing more than a sensible object which may arouse a drive and
cue a response." Underhill Moore & Charles C. Callahan, Law andLearning Theory: A Study in Legal
Control, 53 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (1943). For the behaviorist, then, responsiveness to reasons really means
nothing more than seeking out the lawful correlations between the stimuli that constitute the input (e.g.,
facts, laws, reasons, etc.) and the cognitive output (e.g., a judicial opinion). This, of course, was
precisely Moore's program, under the heading of the institutional method. For further discussion, see
Leiter, supra note 16, at 268. Since most of the Realists, happily, were not orthodox behaviorists, the
notion of being responsive to reasons-legal or nonlegal-is compatible with their work.
57. I am grateful to Joseph Raz for clarification on this issue.
58. On these points, see Leiter, supra note 30, at 489-90, and Leiter, supra note 16, at 275-76.
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responses to certain stimuli; no reference to mental states-beliefs, desires,
etc.-is required. The rhetoric of behaviorism-if not generally behavior-
ism itself-permeated the writings of the Realists: hence the sense of for-
mulating the Core Claim in terms of fact-responsiveness. For the Realist-
cum-behaviorist, the only question is: which stimuli trigger the judicial
response? The Realists hold that it is primarily the underlying facts of the
case, rather than the rules of law, that "trigger" the response.
Yet my formulation of the Core Claim is, importantly, still compatible
with articulations of the same basic view by decidedly antibehavioristic
Realists, like Jerome Frank. Thus, when Frank quotes approvingly a for-
mer ABA President to the effect that "'the way to win a case is to make
the judge want to decide in your favor and then, and then only, to cite
precedents which will justify such a determination,"' 59 I take him to be
supposing the truth of the Core Claim. In the same vein is Frank's obser-
vation that "the judge's innumerable unique traits, dispositions and habits
... shap[e] his decisions" by determining "what he thinks fair or just with
reference to a given set of facts."'  Similarly, in formulating his own
descriptive claim, Frank characterizes the opposing "conventional theory"
as holding that "Rule x Facts = Decision," while his own view is that
"the Stimuli affecting the judge x the Personality of the judge =
Decisions."6 It is, of course, Frank's injection of the "Personality of the
judge" into the formula that puts the distinctive stamp on Frank's inter-
pretation of the Core Claim: drop that and you have the Core Claim itself.
B. The Core Claim and the Received View
What interpretation of the Core Claim would not yield the Received
View, one might wonder? Recall the two aspects of the Received View of
Realism that are at issue here: first is the claim of "Judicial Volition," i.e.,
that judges exercise unfettered choice in picking a result; and second is the
claim of "Judicial Idiosyncrasy," i.e., that judges make this choice in light
of personal or idiosyncratic tastes and values. In its extreme, Frankified
form, the theses of Judicial Volition and Judicial Idiosyncrasy lead to the
conclusion that judicial decision is utterly unpredictable, as it is never
possible to isolate the significant idiosyncratic facts about the individual
judge that influence his essentially unconstrained choice of outcome.62
59. FRANK, supra note 13, at 102-03 n.* (quoting S.S. Gregory).
60. Id. at 110-11.
61. Jerome Frank, Are Judges Human? Part Two: As Through a Class Darkly, 80 U. PA. L. REV.
233, 242 (1931) (emphasis omitted).
62. This is a key theme in FRANK, supra note 13, at 111. Of course, it is possible that we could
formulate good predictive theories even in the absence of knowledge about the causes of decision.
Knowledge of deterministic causation guarantees prediction, but plainly the inverse does not hold. Yet
Frank seems to assume-with at least good epistemic reason-that absent a knowledge of what causes
judges to decide as they do, we will not be able to predict how they will decide.
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But it is precisely this upshot of the Received View that ought to raise
a question about its adequacy. For surely one of the most familiar themes
in the writings of the Realists is their interest in predicting judicial
decisions (or prophesying them, as some Realists put it).63 But if on the
Received View of Realism, prediction of judicial decision is impossible (as
Frank would have it), then the Received View could not possibly be an
adequate account of the views of all those Realists who aimed to provide
predictive theories of judicial decision.
Notice, again, why the problem arises. Where decision is based on
unfettered choice, then there is no way to predict decision: what gives us
an anchor for prediction is precisely the presence of fetters.' 4 If, for
example, choice of decision is a rigid function of race or gender or class,
then these fetters on decision form a basis for predicting decision.
But what "fetters" does the Frankified Received View offer? On the
Received View, the foundation of judicial decision is the various idio-
syncrasies of the individual judge, which not only govern his sense of
justice on a given set of facts, but "the very processes by which he
becomes convinced what those facts are."65 Here, then, the problem is
epistemological: There are indeed determinants of decision (as, of course,
Frank's vulgar armchair Freudianism would imply), but they are inacces-
sible to the observer, the would-be predictor of judicial decision. No law-
yer or scholar could possibly track all the peculiarities of life history and
psychological coloring that go into the process of decision necessary to pre-
dict what judges do. When the "fetters" upon decision are idiosyncratic,
the key to prediction will remain epistemologically opaque. 6
We can now see the contours of the interpretation of the Core Claim
that are needed to distinguish it from the Received View. First, choice of
decision must, in fact, be sufficiently fettered that prediction is possible.
And second, these fetters upon choice must not consist in idiosyncratic
63. See, e.g., LLEWELLYN, supra note 47, at 4; O.W. Holmes, The Path ofthe Law, 10 HARV.
L. REV. 457, 461 (1897); Underhill Moore, Rational Basis of Legal Institutions, 23 COLUM. L. REV.
609, 609-12 (1923).
64. There are really two senses of "fetters" at issue here. The Received View claims that the
Realists believe there are no fetters on (at least many appellate) judicial decisions in the sense of fetters
in the form of legal reasons. All the Realists do, in fact, accept this part of the Received View, so
understood. What they reject, however, is the claim that there aren't fetters in the form of causal deter-
minants of these decisions; thus, most Realists reject the image ofjudges as having unbounded volition
in deciding cases-precisely the image that many writers infer from the Received View. (For
clarification on these issues, I am indebted to Steven Burton.).
65. FRANK, supra note 13, at 110-11.
66. Notice that this means the emphasis on the theme of Judicial Volition is really mistaken even
in the case of Frank: for Frank, judicial decisions are determined, so that, in reality, there is no room
for judicial choice. It is just that both judges themselves, and we as observers of their behavior, will
find it hard, if not impossible, to identify the determinants. For that, the hard work of Freudian
psychoanalysis is required.
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facts about individual judges, but rather must be of sufficient generality or
commonality to be both accessible and to permit formulating general scien-
tific laws of the kind that make prediction possible. I shall call the former
the Determinism Thesis and the second the Generality Thesis. Supplement
the Core Claim with these two theses, and you get not the Frankified
Received View, but a view which, I shall claim, is the dominant view
among Realists.
C. Determinism and Generality
What facts about judges would constitute both fetters on decision and
be sufficiently common among judges that they would form the basis for
lawful (or at least lawlike) predictive generalizations about patterns of
decision? The Realists are, unfortunately, clearer about the patterns than
about the fetters. Yet it is natural to construe them as offering something
like an "inference to the best explanation" :67 given the actual existence of
regular patterns of decision (which we Realists identify), the best explana-
tion for the existence of such regularities must be that judges share certain
features that channel their decisions into these patterns. We can make all
this more concrete by considering some actual examples from the Realist
literature.
The Realists tend to draw their best examples of the Core Claim from
the realm of commercial law (rather, say, than constitutional law-a point
of some significance, to which I return later). Typically, the Realists argue
that what judges decide on the facts in such cases falls into one of two
patterns: either (1) judges enforce the norms of the prevailing commercial
culture; or (2) they try to reach the decision that is socio-economically best
under the circumstances. Oliphant, looking at a series of conflicting court
decisions on the validity of contractual promises not to compete, illustrates
both ways in which decisions track the underlying facts of cases:
[A]II the cases holding the promises invalid are found to be cases of
employees' promises not to compete with their employers after a
term of employment. Contemporary guild [i.e., labor union]
regulations not noticed in the opinions made their holding eminently
sound. All the cases holding the promises valid were cases of
promises by those selling a business and promising not to compete
with the purchasers. Contemporary economic reality made these
holdings eminently sound. 61
Thus, in the former fact-scenarios, the courts enforced the prevailing norms
(as expressed in guild regulations disfavoring such promises); in the latter
67. Gilbert H. Harman, The Inference to the Best Explanation, 74 PHIL. REv. 88, 88 (1965).
68. Oliphant, supra note 41, at 159.
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cases, the courts came out differently because it was economically best
under those factual circumstances to do so.
Llewellyn provides a similar illustration.69 A series of New York
cases applied the rule that a buyer who rejects the seller's shipment by
formally stating his objections thereby waives all other objections.
Llewellyn notes that the rule seems to have been rather harshly applied in
a series of cases where the buyers simply may not have known at the time
of rejection of other defects or where the seller could not have cured
anyway. But a careful study of the facts of these cases revealed that in
each case where the rule seemed harshly applied, what had really happened
was that the market had fallen, and the buyer was looking to escape the
contract. The court in each case, being "sensitive to commerce or to
decency,"7 applied the unrelated rule about rejection to frustrate the
buyer's attempt to escape the contract. Thus the commercial norm-buyers
ought to honor their commitments even under changed market conditions-
is enforced by the courts through a seemingly harsh application of an
unrelated rule concerning rejection. It is these "background facts, those of
mercantile practice, those of the situation-type" 7 that determine the
course of decision.
Underhill Moore tried to systematize this approach in what he called
"the institutional method." ' Moore's idea was this: identify the normal
behavior for any "institution" (e.g., commercial banking); then identify
and demarcate deviations from this norm quantitatively, and try to identify
the point at which deviation from the norm will cause a judicial decision
that corrects the deviation from the norm (e.g., how far a bank must depart
from normal check-cashing practice before a court will decide against the
bank in a suit brought by the customer). The goal is a predictive formula:
deviation of degree x from "[i]nstitutional behavior-i.e., behavior which
frequently, repeatedly, usually occurs"7-will cause courts to act. Thus,
says Moore: "the semblance of causal relation between future and past
decisions is the result of the relation of both to a third variable, the
relevant institutions in the locality of the court. 74 Put differently, what
judges respond to is the extent to which the facts show a deviation from the
prevailing norm in the commercial culture.
69. See LLEWELLYN, supra note 47, at 122-24.
70. Id. at 124.
71. Id. at 126.
72. Moore & Hope, supra note 52.
73. Id. at 707.
74. Underhill Moore & Gilbert Sussman, Legal and Institutional Methods Applied to the Debiting
of Direct Discounts-VI. The Decisions, the Institutions, and the Degree of Deviation, 40 YALE L.J.
1219, 1219 (1931).
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We may call this approach-to distinguish it from Frank's
"Idiosyncrasy Wing" of Realism 75-the "Sociological Wing" of Realism,
for reasons that will be made clear momentarily, if they are not apparent
already. Notice, first, that the theory of the Sociological Wing-that
judges enforce the norms of commercial culture or try to do what is socio-
economically best on the facts of the case-should not be confused with the
idea that judges decide based, for example, on how they feel about the
particular parties or the lawyers. These "fireside equities "76 may some-
times influence judges, but what more typically determines the course of
decision is the "situation-type," i.e., the general pattern of behavior
exemplified by the particular facts of the disputed transaction,' and what
would constitute normal or socio-economically desirable behavior in the
relevant commercial context. The point is decidedly not that judges usually
decide because of idiosyncratic likes and dislikes with respect to the
individuals before the court.7 8
But why would judges, with some degree of predictable uniformity,
enforce the norms of commercial culture as applied to the underlying facts
of the case? Here is where we must make an inference to the best explana-
tion of the phenomenon: there must be features of the "sociological" (as
opposed to the idiosyncratic psychological) profile of the judges that
explain the predictable uniformity in their decisions.79 The Realists did
little more than gesture, however, at a suitable psycho-social explanation.
"Professional judicial office," Llewellyn suggested, was "the most
important among all the lines of factors which make for reckonability" of
75. Frank was joined in this wing by Judge Hutcheson and the Yale psychologist Edward
Robinson. See EDWARD STEVENS ROBINSON, LAW AND THE LAWYERS (1935); Hutcheson, supra note
42. The label ("Idiosyncracy Wing") is, however, mine.
76. LLEWELLYN, supra note 47, at 121.
77. This becomes clear in the sort of instructional materials Realists prepared, which were organ-
ized not around doctrinal categories, but rather around factual scenarios or "situation types." For
example, Leon Green's torts casebook was originally organized not by the typical doctrinal categories
(e.g., negligence, intentional torts, strict liability), but rather by the situation types in which harms
occur: e.g., Surgical Operations (Chapter 2), Keeping of Animals (Chapter 3), Manufacturers, Dealers
(Chapter 5), Builders, Contractors, Workmen (Chapter 6), Traffic and Transportation (Chapter 9).
LEON GREEN, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN TORT CASES at ix-x (1931). For Green, the Realist, there
was no law of torts per se, but rather a regime of tort rules for "surgical operations," another for
.manufacturers," etc. For a similar approach to a different area of law, see CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT,
CASES ON REMEDIES (1955) (dividing the subject not by type of remedy, but by type of injury). A
related view of law (notably contract law) has been taken up more recently in transaction cost
economics. See, e.g., WILLIAMSON, supra note 25, at 13-16.
78. Cf. Radin, supra note 51, at 357.
79. By dubbing the profile "sociological," I mean to be inclusive, rather than exclusive: the idea
is that judges instantiate general characteristics, rather than idiosyncratic ones. What these general
characteristics are may be illuminated by sociology, or social psychology, or anthropology.
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decision;' "the office waits and then moves with majestic power to shape
the man. 8 Echoing, but modifying Frank, Llewellyn continued:
The place to begin is with the fact that the men of our appellate
bench are human beings .... And one of the more obvious and
obstinate facts about human beings is that they operate in and
respond to traditions .... Tradition grips them, shapes them, limits
them, guides them .... To a man of sociology or psychology...
this needs no argument .... I
Radin suggested that "the standard transactions with their regulatory
incidents are familiar ones to him [the judge] because of his experience as
a citizen and a lawyer."83 Felix Cohen, by contrast, simply lamented that
"at present no publication [exists] showing the political, economic, and
professional background and activities of our various judges, 84
presumably because such a publication would identify the relevant "social"
determinants of decision.'
Thus, if the Sociological Wing of Realism-Llewellyn, Moore,
Oliphant, Cohen, Radin, among others-is correct, then judicial decisions
are causally determined by the relevant psycho-social facts about judges,
and at the same time judicial decisions fall into predictable patterns because
these psycho-social facts about judges-their professionalization
experiences, their backgrounds, etc.-are not idiosyncratic, but character-
istic of significant portions of the judiciary. Rather than rendering judicial
decision a mystery, the Realists' Core Claim, to the extent it is true, shows
how and why lawyers can predict what courts do.
Notice, too, that for the Sociological Wing it should also be possible
to craft legal rules that really would "guide" decision, or at least accurately
describe the course of decision actually realized by courts. This is exactly
why Oliphant, for example, spoke of a "return" to stare decisis: the prob-
lem for Oliphant, as for most of the Realists in the 'Sociological Wing,
wasn't that rules were pointless, but rather that the existing rules were
pitched at a level of generality that bore no relation to the fact-specific
ways in which courts actually decided cases.86 Where it was impossible
80. LLEWELLYN, supra note 47, at 45 (emphasis omitted).
81. Id. at 48 (emphasis in original).
82. Id. at 53.
83. Radin, supra note 51, at 358.
84. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV.
809, 846 (1935).
85. "A truly realistic theory ofjudicial decisions," says Cohen, "must conceive every decision as
something more than an expression of individual personality, as ... even more importantly . . . a
product of social determinants . . . ." Id. at 843. This notion is taken up at length in the extensive
political science literature on judicial decisionmaking. See infra text accompanying note 139.
86. See Oliphant, supra note 41, at 72. Charles Alan Wright, President of the American Law
Institute and a self-identified Realist, points out to me that the Restatements have gradually moved in
precisely the direction of crafting more fact-specific rules, reflecting the Realist insight.
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to formulate situation-specific rules, the Realists advocated using general
norms, reflecting the norms that judges actually employ anyway. This
formed a central part of Llewellyn's approach to drafting Article 2 of the
UCC-an undertaking that would seem impossible for the Realist-as-Rule-
Skeptic of popular imagination. Since the Sociological Wing claimed that
judges, in any event, enforced the norms of commercial culture, Article 2
tells them to do precisely this, by imposing the obligation of "good faith"
in contractual dealingsY "Good faith" requires, among other things,
"the observation of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the
trade.""8 For a judge, then, to enforce the rule requiring "good faith" is
just to enforce the norms of commercial culture-which is precisely what
the Realists claim the judges are doing anyway!
III. Naturalism and Pragmatism in Legal Theory
A. Introduction
So far, we have seen that the dominant view among Legal Realists is
not the Frankified Received View so common in the secondary literature,
but rather the Core Claim as seen through the lens of the Determinism and
Generality Theses. On this account, Realists advance (1) a descriptive
theory about the nature of judicial decision, according to which (2) judicial
decisions fall into (sociologically) determined patterns, in which (3) judges
reach results based on a (generally shared) response to the underlying facts
of the case, which (4) they then rationalize after-the-fact with appropriate
legal rules and reasons.8 9 If this theory of judicial decision-making is
different from Frank's psychologistic interpretation of the Core Claim, it
is even more different from the inquiries constituting traditional juris-
prudential theories. It is to these profound differences with the mainstream
of the jurisprudential tradition that I want to turn in the remainder of this
Article.
As a jurisprudential theory, Realism is marked by two distinctive
philosophical commitments: what I shall call "Naturalism" and
"Pragmatism." According to the Naturalism, a satisfactory theory of
adjudication must be continuous with empirical inquiry in the natural and
social sciences. 9' According to the Pragmatism, a satisfactory theory of
87. U.C.C. § 1-203 (1994).
88. Id. § 2-103(1)(b).
89. Compare this formulation with the Received View set forth supra text accompanying notes 6-7.
90. For some representative statements of the "naturalistic" position in philosophy, see Daniel
Dennett, Foreword to RUTH GARRETT MILLIKAN, LANGUAGE, THOUGHT, AND OTHER BIOLOGICAL
CATEGORIES at ix-x (1984) and Peter Railton, Naturalism and Prescriptivity, in FOUNDATIONS OF
MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 155-63 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 1990). Railton calls this
view "methodological" naturalism. Id. at 155, 155-57.
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adjudication for lawyers must enable lawyers to predict what courts will
do.9' Naturalism and Pragmatism are linked in the following way: To
predict reliably and effectively what courts will do one should know what
causes courts to decide as they do. The causes of judicial decision, in turn,
are only available to the sort of empirical inquiry modeled on the natural
and social sciences that the Realists advocate.' A naturalistic theory of
adjudication, then, must produce a pragmatically valuable theory for
lawyers, i.e., one that will enable them to predict what courts will do.
In the following sections, I explicate the notions of Naturalism and
Pragmatism and their relevance to legal theory-though I do so for differ-
ing reasons. In the case of Naturalism, its import for jurisprudence has yet
to be recognized; in the case of Pragmatism, its import has been generally
misunderstood or crudely understood. To construe the Realists as intro-
ducing Naturalism and Pragmatism into jurisprudence is to understand them
to be doing something quite precise.
B. Naturalism
Naturalism is a familiar development in recent philosophy-indeed, it
would not be wrong to say that it is the distinctive development in philo-
sophy over the last thirty years. The linguistic turn of the first half of this
century (in which traditional philosophical problems were framed as prob-
lems about our use of language) has either given way to or been supple-
mented by the naturalistic turn, in which traditional philosophical problems
are thought to be insoluble by the a priori, armchair methods of the
philosopher, and to require, instead, embedding in-or replacement by-
suitable empirical theories. 93 To name the major philosophical thinkers
91. I will follow the Realists in analyzing these problems primarily from the standpoint of litigators
rather than transactional lawyers.
92. This assumes, of course, that the Realists are correct that the law is rationally indeterminate,
Le., that the applicable legal reasons do not justify a unique outcome.
93. In some measure, this may sound surprising to those who associate recent philosophy with
postmodemism," understood as a philosophical position to the effect that there is no objective truth,
that objective knowledge of the world is impossible, that there are no "essences," that the era of
"metanarratives" (in Lyotard's famous phrase) is past. See JEAN-FRANCOIS LYOTARD, THE
POSTMODERN CONDION at xxiii-xxiv (Geoff Bennington & Brian Massumi trans., 1984).
Postmodernism in this philosophical sense, however, is distinguished by two characteristics: first,
almost no philosophers believe it; second, it is supported by bad arguments. The two characteristics
are obviously connected.
The bad arguments take two forms: what we may call the "Disappointed Absolutist" argument
(to borrow Hart's apt term for a similar view in The Concept of Law, HART, supra note 15, at 135),
and the "Flesh & Blood" argument. The Disappointed Absolutist argument runs as follows: Assuming
some impossibly high standard for what will count as "justification," "objectivity," or "semantic
determinacy," it turns out that no beliefs are justified, that no claims about the world are objective, and
that no texts have determinate meanings. See id. (noting that skepticism about legal rules often stems
from the adoption of an unattainable standard for what is to count as a rule). The problem with this
argument, which leads almost all philosophers to dissent from it, is that it never queries whether the
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of the last quarter century is to name philosophers with profoundly natural-
istic commitments (of varying sorts): WV.O. Quine, Jerry Fodor, David
Armstrong, David Lewis, Jaegwon Kim, and Alvin Goldman, among
underlying standard of justification, objectivity, or semantic determinacy is sensible or plausible, or
whether it is what we really mean when we talk about justification or objectivity or determinacy. See,
e.g., JOHN M. ELLIS, AGAINST DECONSTRUCTION 77-79 (1989); JAMES S. FISHKIN, BEYOND
SUBJECTIVE MORALITY 129 (1984); HILARY PUTNAM, REASON, TRUTH AND HISTORY 160-68 (1981);
Judith Jarvis Thomson, Moral Objectivity, in GILBERT HARMAN & JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, MORAL
RELATIVISM AND MORAL OBJECTIVITY 65, 154 (1996). (Some philosophers dissent for a slightly
different reason: they think the high standard of justification or of objectivity can be met. See, e.g.,
PANAYOT BUTCHVAROV, SKEPTICISM IN ETHICS 3-10 (1989). The postmodernist literature never
evinces even an awareness of these arguments.)
The Flesh & Blood argument runs this way: since, as knowers, we cannot escape our human
situation-we cannot transcend, as it were, our flesh and blood (not to mention our race, our gender,
our class, etc.)-we can never have objective knowledge of the world. See, e.g., STANLEY FISH,
DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY 1, 5-6 (1989). To some extent, this argument piggy-backs on the
Disappointed Absolutist argument. Yet it also introduces a new element, an explanation for why we
cannot meet the high standards the latter argument presupposes: because we are always "situated." The
mistake of this argument is to draw a false inference from the fact (is it an objective fact?) of our being
"situated" to the conclusion that we cannot transcend our situation. There is certainly not a philosopher
alive today who would deny that, as knowers, our beliefs about the world are shaped by our
"situation": our particular cultural and historical moment, the particular traditions that inform our sensi-
bility and judgment, the theoretical paradigms that determine how the world appears to us, and the
natural and bodily endowment that may make us who we are. Almost all of this is banal in the post-
Kantian philosophical universe; and even in the pre-Kantian one, it has its adherents, like Hume. (This
notwithstanding Steven Winter's wildly mistaken claim that Hume was guilty of an "emphasis on
Reason as a transcendent faculty." Steven L. Winter, Bull Durham and the Uses of Theory, 42 STAN.
L. REV. 639, 658 (1990).) Even if we are situated-as no one denies-it may still be possible to have
objective knowledge of a strongly objective world. This is precisely what post-Kuhnian and post-
Quinean philosophers like Richard Boyd, Philip Kitcher, and Peter Railton have been arguing for the
last twenty years. Perhaps they are wrong. But if they are, it is not because they do not recognize the
banal fact that we are "situated"; rather, it is because their arguments for how we overcome the limits
of our situation are wrong. But, once again, the postmodemist literature is blissfully unaware that there
could even be such arguments.
In any event, it is safe to say that outside of parts of academic culture in the humanities, social
sciences, and law, postmodernism (in the philosophical sense described above) has been almost
completely irrelevant. Recent years, in fact, have witnessed a proliferation of essentialist theories about
human beings and other naturalistic "metanarratives." Peter Kramer's best-seller is typical of the real
zeitgeist. "Our culture is caught in a frenzy of biological materialism," observes Kramer. "[The]
impressive, close-up view of the power of biology over an unexpectedly broad spectrum of human
behavior [provided by psychopharmacological drugs like Prozac] ... ha[s] done a good deal to move
my assumptions about how people are constituted in the direction of the contemporary zeitgeist."
PETER D. KRAMER, LISTENING TO PROZAC at xiii, xv (1993). Postmodemists would do well to heed
Nietzsche's methodological proclamation that
the basic text of homo natura must again be recognized: ... To translate man back into
nature ... to see to it that man henceforth stands before man as even today, hardened in
the discipline of science .... Why did we choose this insane task? Or, putting it
differently: why have knowledge at all?
FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL 161-62 (Walter Kaufmann trans., 1966). (On
Nietzsche's naturalism, see Brian Leiter, Nietzsche and Aestheticism, 30 J. HIST. PHIL. 275, 278-80
(1992), and Brian Leiter, The Paradox of Fatalism and Self-Creation in Nietzsche, in WILLING AND
NOTHINGNESS: SCHOPENHAUER AS NIETZSCHE'S EDUCATOR (Christopher Janaway ed., forthcoming
1998).)
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others. It remains true, of course, that there are powerful philosophical
voices aligned against Naturalism, like that of Richard Rorty,94 or recent
Hilary Putnam,95 or John McDowell.96 It is beyond the scope of this
paper to explain fully where these philosophers go wrong, though I shall
make some responsive points in what follows.' Suffice it to say that
theirs is a minority position in contemporary philosophy.9"
What really bears noticing here is that while every area of
philosophy-metaethics, philosophy of language, epistemology, etc.-has
undergone a naturalistic turn over the last quarter-century, Anglo-American
legal philosophy has remained untouched by these intellectual
developments. Of course, this observation constitutes no argument; what
I hope to show in the following pages is that the isolation of Anglo-
American jurisprudence in this regard is a mistake, and that it is in the
Realists themselves that we will find the first paradigm for a naturalized
jurisprudence.
1. The Varieties of Naturalism.-What is Naturalism and how is it
relevant to legal theory? This is a large question, which will receive only
a partial answer here." I propose to concentrate in what follows on that
aspect of Naturalism most relevant to an understanding of the Legal
Realists, what I call below "Replacement Naturalism."
Naturalism in philosophy is always first a methodological view to the
effect that philosophical theorizing should be continuous with empirical
94. See, e.g., RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE passim (1979).
95. See, e.g., HILARY PUTNAM, Objectivity and the Science/Ethics Distinction, in REALISM WITH
A HUMAN FACE 166 (1990). See also Putnam's reply to me-in which the anti-naturalism is quite
explicit-in Hilary Putnam, Replies, 1 LEGAL THEORY 69, 70-72 (1995).
96. See, e.g., JOHN McDOWELL, MIND AND WORLD 66-86 (1994). McDowell views himself as
a "naturalist," just not what he calls a "bald naturalist." Id. at 72. Many philosophers, myself
included, are inclined to think that McDowell's "naturalism" simply represents an unprincipled
expansion of the category to encompass precisely those phenomena that seem to have a dubious status
in a naturalistic conception of the world. For critical discussion, see Crispin Wright, Human Nature?,
5 EUR. J. PHIL. 235 (1996) (reviewing MCDOWELL, supra).
97. For a splendid critique of McDowell's cryptic brand of anti-naturalism, see Jerry Fodor,
Encounters with Trees, LONDON REV. BOOKS, Apr. 20, 1995, at 10, 10-11 (reviewing McDOWELL,
supra note 96). Of the many critiques of Rorty, one of the best and most to-the-point remains Jaegwon
Kim, Rorty on the Possibility of Philosophy, 77 J. PHIL. 588 (1980).
98. If one looks at, say, the top five graduate programs in philosophy-Princeton, Rutgers, NYU,
Michigan, and Pittsburgh-only Pittsburgh (where McDowell teaches) could be described as having any
significant representation of the anti-naturalist position (broadly construed). By contrast, naturalism
(in one shape or another) clearly dominates the research programs at Princeton, Rutgers, NYU, and
Michigan. As Thomas Nagel (at NYU) has recently observed, the naturalistic approach "that sees
philosophy as continuous with science, only more abstract and more general ... is now very common
among analytic philosophers, including many of the best minds in the subject .... [T]he Camap-Quine
[naturalistic] tradition has come to dominate the profession." THOMAS NAGEL, OTHER MINDS 6
(1995).
99. For a more substantial treatment, see Brian Leiter, Naturalism and Naturalized Jurisprudence,
in ANALYZING LAW: NEW ESSAYS IN LEGAL THEORY (Brian Bix ed., forthcoming 1998).
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inquiry in the sciences."°  The naturalist, following Quine, rejects the
idea that there could be a "first philosophy," a philosophical solution to
problems that proceeds a priori, that is, prior to any experience.101
Instead, the philosophical naturalist demands continuity with the natural and
social sciences in one or both of the following ways: what I will call
"Results Continuity" and "Methods Continuity."
Results Continuity requires that the claims of philosophical theories be
supported by the results of successful sciences. Epistemologists like Alvin
Goldman look to the results of psychology and cognitive science to find out
how the human cognitive apparatus really works; only with that infor-
mation in hand, argues Goldman, can the epistemologist construct norms
for how humans ought to form beliefs."°  Methods Continuity, by
contrast, demands only that philosophical theories emulate the methods of
inquiry and styles of explanation characteristic of successful sciences. °3
Historically, this has been the most important type of Naturalism in
philosophy, evidenced in writers from Hume to Nietzsche." Hume and
Nietzsche, for example, both construct "speculative" theories of human
nature-modelled on the most influential scientific paradigms of the day
(Newtonian mechanics, in the case of Hume; nineteenth-century
physiology, in the case of Nietzsche)-in order to "solve" various
philosophical problems."° Their speculative theories are "modelled" on
the sciences most importantly in that they take over from science the idea
that we can understand all phenomena in terms of deterministic causes. 'I
100. The failure of philosophers to solve the so-called "demarcation problem"-Le., the problem
of what demarcates genuine science from pseudo-science-does not, as far as I can see, doom this
definition of naturalism, just as the "paradox of the heap" does not doom our ability to distinguish
heaps from single grains-even if, in both cases, there are fuzzy borderline cases.
101. It bears emphasizing here that most contemporary naturalists do not go as far as Quine in
repudiating the idea of a "first philosophy" (nor in embracing his austere physicalism-see, e.g.,
CHRISTOPHER HOOKWAY, QUINE: LANGUAGE, EXPERIENCE AND REALITY 124 (1988)). While all
would concur with Quine that philosophy cannot be exclusively an a priori discipline, most naturalists
still think there is significant work for conceptual analysis to do. A classic example is ALVIN I.
GOLDMAN, EPISTEMOLOGY AND COGNITION (1986).
102. See GOLDMAN, supra note 101, passim.
103. Such a view does not suppose the methodological unity of the various sciences; so as not to
be empty, it does require that the methods of the sciences not be so various as to encompass all possible
methodological postures.
104. On Hume, see the discussion in BARRY STROUD, HUME 1-16, 219-50 (1977); on Nietzsche,
see the discussion in the sources cited supra note 93.
105. The similarity between these two thinkers goes even deeper. Both can be read as arguing
that given the failure of rational vindications of our beliefs-moral and otherwise-we must seek a
naturalistic explanation for them. If there is an important difference between Hume and Nietzsche, it
is that Nietzsche's speculative theories are generally more plausible than Hume's.
106. "[Ihe key to understanding Hume's philosophy is to see him as putting forward a general
theory of human nature in just the way that, say, Freud or Marx did.... And the theories they
advance are all, roughly, deterministic." STROUD, supra note 104, at 4. For Freud, the deterministic
causes are various unconscious drives and desires; for Nietzsche, they include both drives and
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Just as we understand events in the inanimate world by identifying the
natural causes that determined them, so, too, we understand human beliefs,
values, and actions by locating their causal determinants in various features
of human nature.
Methodological Naturalists, then, construct philosophical theories that
are continuous with the sciences either in virtue of their dependence upon
the actual results of scientific method in different domains or in virtue of
their employment and emulation of distinctively scientific ways of looking
at and explaining things. 7 But we must still distinguish between two
different branches of Methodological Naturalism: the Quinean and the
Goldmanesque. The former I will call Replacement Naturalism; the latter
Normative Naturalism. Goldman's paradigm of Normative Naturalism has
dominated philosophical research in the area,0 8 though it is Quine's
notion of Replacement Naturalism that bears most immediately on Legal
Realism. Since both Replacement and Normative Naturalists share the
methodological commitment distinctive of Naturalism-to make philo-
sophical theorizing continuous with and dependent upon scientific
theorizing-the difference must be located elsewhere: not in methodology,
but in goal. According to Replacement Naturalists, the goal of theorizing
is description or explanation; according to Normative Naturalists, the goal
physiological causes. See Leiter, The Paradox of Fatalism and Self-Creation in Nietzsche, supra note
93. Other aspects of scientific "method" that have also been influential in philosophy include a
commitment to seeking empirical confirmation of theoretical claims, and, concomitantly, a commitment
to the experimental method.
107. Many naturalists go beyond methodological naturalism, however, and embrace a substantive
doctrine. "Substantive Naturalism" in philosophy is either the "ontological" view that the only things
that exist are natural or physical things; or the "semantic" view that a suitable philosophical analysis
of any concept must show it to be amenable to empirical inquiry. In the ontological sense, Substantive
Naturalism is often taken to entail physicalism-the doctrine that only those properties picked out by
the laws of the physical sciences are real. In the semantic sense, Substantive Naturalism is just the
view that predicates like "morally good" can be analyzed in terms of characteristics-e.g., "maximizing
human well-being"-that admit of empirical inquiry-e.g., by psychology and physiology, assuming
that well-being is a function of psychological and physical condition.
Many philosophers are drawn to some type of Substantive Naturalism by their Methodological
Naturalism: being a philosophical naturalist in the methodological sense sometimes leads a philosopher
to think that the best philosophical account of some concept or domain will be in terms that are substan-
tively naturalistic. But it is important to notice that a commitment to Methodological Naturalism does
not entail this conclusion: methodologically, it is an open question whether the best philosophical
account of morality or mentality or law must be in substantively naturalistic terms. Too often, it seems
to me, philosophers conflate "naturalism" with substantive naturalism. See, e.g., Philip Pettit,
Naturalism, in A COMPANION TO EPIsTEMOLOGY 296-97 (Jonathan Dancy & Ernest Sosa eds., 1992)
("[Naturalism] is the doctrine that there are only natural things: only natural particulars and only natural
properties."); Steven J. Wagner & Richard Warner, Introduction to NATURALISM: A CRITICAL
APPRAISAL 1-3 (Steven J. Wagner & Richard Warner eds., 1993). But from the standpoint of the
Methodological Naturalist, this prejudges too many issues in precisely the a priori fashion that
Methodological Naturalism was meant to rule out.
108. See, e.g., Philip Kitcher, The Naturalists Return, 101 PHIL. REV. 53 (1992) (surveying recent
literature).
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is regulation of practice through the promulgation of norms or
standards."°  I plan to concentrate here on Replacement Naturalism; I
take up the relationship between Realism and Normative Naturalism
elsewhere."10
The locus classicus of Replacement Naturalism is, of course, Quine's
1968 paper, Epistemology Naturalized."' The central enterprise of epis-
temology on Quine's view is to understand the relation between our
theories of the world and the evidence (i.e., sensory input) on which they
are based. Quine's target is one influential construal of this project:
Cartesian foundationalism, particularly in the sophisticated form given to
it in the twentieth century by Rudolf Carnap in Der Logische Aufbau der
%I~lt."' The foundationalist wants an account of the theory-evidence
relation that would vindicate the privileged epistemic status of at least some
subset of our theories: our theories (in particular, our best theories of
natural science) are to be "grounded" in indubitable evidence (e.g., imme-
diate sense impressions). As is quite familiar, foundationalism, for Quine,
is a failure, rendered unrealizable by Quinean meaning holism on the one
hand (theoretical terms get their meanings from their place in the whole
theoretical framework, not in virtue of some point-by-point contact with
sensory input), and the Duhem-Quine thesis about the underdetermination
of theory by evidence on the other (there is always more than one theory
consistent with the evidence, in part, because a theoretical hypothesis can
always be preserved in the face of recalcitrant evidence by abandoning the
auxiliary hypotheses that informed the test of the hypothesis)."'
What becomes, then, of epistemology? Hilary Kornblith has summed
up Quine's view as follows:
109. Notice that this latter goal is not peculiar to Normative Naturalism-it is equally well the goal
of traditional epistemology, from Descartes to the early Carnap. The methods employed to realize this
goal distinguish the Normative Naturalist from the traditional epistemologist. See GOLDMAN, supra
note 101, at 6-9 (contrasting scientific approaches to cognition with historical epistemology).
110. See Leiter, supra note 99.
111. W.V. Quine, Epistemology Naturalized, in ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY AND OTHER ESSAYS
69 (1969); see also W.V. Quine, Grades of Theoreticity, in EXPERIENCE AND THEORY 1 (Lawrence
Foster & Joe Swanson eds., 1970).
112. RUDOLF CARNAP, DER LGISCHE AUFBAU DER WELT (1928). The titie is usually translated
as "The Logical Structure of the World," though the literal rendering of auflau as "building-up" con-
veys nicely the foundationalist flavor of the project.
113. See the astute summary in Jaegwon Kim, What is "Naturalized Epistemology"?, 2 PHIL.
PERSPECT. 381, 385-86 (1988). For reasons of simplicity of presentation, I am blurring two issues
here. The foundationalist program, at least in the early Carnap (who later repudiates it), has two parts:
semantic and epistemic. The semantic program is to translate all sentences referring to physical objects
into the language of sense-data (e.g., "I am being appeared to greenly now."). The epistemic program
is to show that scientific theories about the physical world are uniquely justified on the basis of sensory
experience. Semantic holism dooms the first project. Hume on induction and the Duhem-Quine thesis
about underdetermination doom the second.
1997]
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Once we see the sterility of the foundationalist program, we see that
the only genuine questions there are to ask about the relation between
theory and evidence and about the acquisition of belief are
psychological questions. "4
This view Kornblith aptly dubs Quine's "replacement thesis": "the view
that epistemological questions may be replaced by psychological
questions."" 5 Here is how Quine puts it:
The stimulation of his sensory receptors is all the evidence anybody
has had to go on, ultimately, in arriving at his picture of the world.
Why not just see how this construction really proceeds? Why not
settle for psychology? Such a surrender of the epistemological
burden to psychology is a move that was disallowed in earlier times
as circular reasoning. If the epistemologist's goal is validation of the
grounds of empirical science, he defeats his purpose by using
psychology or other empirical science in the validation. However,
such scruples against circularity have little point once we have
stopped dreaming of deducing science from observations.t"
6
Quine continues that on his proposal,
[e]pistemology, or something like it, simply falls into place as a
chapter of psychology and hence of natural science. It studies a
natural phenomenon, viz., a physical human subject. This human
subject is accorded a certain experimentally controlled input-certain
patterns of irradiation in assorted frequencies, for instance-and in
the fullness of time the subject delivers as output a description of the
three-dimensional external world and its history. The relation
between the meager input and the torrential output is a relation that
we are prompted to study for somewhat the same reasons that always
prompted epistemology; namely, in order to see how evidence relates
to theory, and in what ways one's theory of nature transcends any
available evidence." 7
Thus Quine: the central concern of epistemology is the theory-evidence
relationship; if the foundationalist story about this relationship is a failure,
then that leaves only one story worth telling about this relationship,
namely, the story told by "a purely descriptive, causal-nomological science
of human cognition."" t. The science of human cognition replaces arm-
chair epistemology: we naturalize epistemology by turning over its central
114. Hilary Kornblith, Introduction: What Is Naturalistic Epistemology?, in NATURALIZING
EPISTEMOLOGY 4 (Hilary Komblith ed., 2d ed. 1994).
115. Id. at4.
116. Quine, Epistemology Naturalized, supra note 111, at 75-76.
117. Id. at 82-83.
118. Kim, supra note 113, at 388.
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question-the relationship between theory and evidence-to the relevant
empirical science.
We can now generalize Quine's point as follows. Let us say that a
Replacement Naturalist in any branch of philosophy holds that:
For any pair of relata that might stand in a justificatory relation-
e.g., evidence and theory, reasons and belief, legal reasons and
judicial decision-if no normative account of the relation is possible,
then the only theoretically fruitful account is the
descriptive/explanatory account given by the relevant science of that
domain. "9
This generalizes Quine's point in one important respect, for Quine infers
Replacement Naturalism only from the failure of foundationalism-which
is simply one possible normative account of the evidence-theory
relationship, but not the only one. Quine's arguments simply do not show
that no other normative account of the evidence-theory relationship is
possible. Quine has been extensively criticized on precisely this score.' 20
The key to a successful defense of Replacement Naturalism, in my view,
lies in the implicit notion of fruitfulness of theoretical investigation. The
Quinean rejoinder must take the form of saying: "Once we give up on the
foundational project of justification, nothing we have to say about
justification will be of much theoretical interest; theorizing about
justification will collapse, as it were, into a banal descriptive sociology of
our justificatory practices." 121 Put more simply: if we can't carry out the
119. One might, of course, hold that the descriptive account just gives us all there is to
justification: so, e.g., describing the causal history of a belief may be all there is to justifying that
belief. See the discussion in Fodor, supra note 97. The possibility, however, has no bearing on the
project here.
120. See, e.g., BARRY STROUD, THE SIGNIFICANCE OFPHILOSOPHICAL SKEPTICISM 211-54 (1984);
Stephen Stich, Naturalizing Epistemology: Quine, Simon and the Prospects for Pragmatism, in
PHILOSOPHY AND COGNITIVE SCIENCE 3-5 (Christopher Hookway & Donald Peterson eds., 1993); see
also GOLDMAN, supra note 101, at 3, 2-3 (arguing that "traditional epistemology has a strong
evaluative normative strain" neglected by Quine's conception of epistemology as a branch of
psychology); Kim, supra note 113, at 391. For a rather different view, however, see Richard Foley,
Quine and Naturalized Epistemology, 19 MIDWEST STUD. PHIL. 243 (1994). Foley rejects the
.standard interpretation of Quine's view,"-roughly, my interpretation in the text-calling attention
instead to places where Quine affirms a normative role even for his naturalized epistemology. Id. at
246, 246-50. While Foley correctly recognizes that for Quine these norms admit of no a priori
justification, he seems to think this is trivial, since (1) the norms Quine favors are ones we could almost
never give up anyway; and (2) Quine identifies them, according to Foley, from the "armchair" rather
than empirically. Id. at 253-59. Foley's provocative paper, in my view, underestimates how much
of a break this really is from the tradition, and overestimates how much normative epistemology Quine
really offers. I hope to take up these ideas elsewhere.
121. This view of Quine is implicit in Rorty's provocative interpretation in RORTY, supra note 94,
at 165-212. As Rorty says of Wilfrid Sellars and Quine: "[Tiheir holism is a product of their
commitment to the thesis that justification is not a matter of a special relation between ideas (or words)
and objects, but of conversation, of social practice .... [W]e understand knowledge when we
understand the social justification of belief.. . ." Id. at 170. But this gets Quine wrong in an
1997]
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program of normative foundationalism, then we might as well do some-
thing useful and interesting, namely empirical theory.
Why is normative theory sterile without foundationalism? Let me give
one brief example to illustrate the point. It is now a familiar result of
cognitive psychology that human beings regularly make mistakes in logical
reasoning. '2 So a mere descriptive theory of belief-formation, of the
sort Quine appears to recommend, would simply record these mistakes.
But shouldn't epistemology tell us that beliefs ought not to be formed
illogically? One can hardly imagine why Quine would disagree: one ought
not to form beliefs illogically. But the question is whether this piece of
banal advice adds up to a fruitful research program. Quine, I take it,
thinks it does not. The descriptive project of Replacement Naturalism may
record certain irrational cognitive processes in studying the evidence-theory
relationship, but given the underdetermination of theory by evidence, even
when we correct for logical mistakes, we still won't have an account of
which theoretical beliefs are warranted and which are not. The Quinean
intuition is that we'll learn more from the empirical inquiry than from
systematizing our mundane normative intuitions about irrationality.
Moreover, this latter project will still have to collapse into the descriptive
sociology of knowledge unless we have some foundational point outside
our epistemic practices from which to assess the epistemic issues.
Otherwise we can do no more than report what it is we do. But it is
precisely the viability of such an external standpoint that Quine denies.113
2. Naturalism and Legal Theory.-We saw that Quine's argument for
Replacement Naturalism moved in two steps. Step one was
antifoundationalism: no unique theory is justified on the basis of the
evidential input. Step two was replacement: since no foundational story
can be told about the relation between input (evidence) and output (theory),
why not replace the normative program with a purely descriptive inquiry,
e.g., the psychological study of what input causes what output? We can
important respect, for it makes it sound like Quine has some positive view about justification, namely
that it consists in "social practice." But Quine's point, as I read him, is that there's nothing to
"understand [about] knowledge" at all, if "understanding knowledge" means understandingjustification.
If we could have told the foundationalist story about justification, that would have been interesting, but
we can't, thinks Quine, so justification simply drops out of the picture as a topic for fruitful theoretical
inquiry. Someone might do the descriptive sociology and map the "social justification of belief" as we
find it, but that wouldn't shed special light on justification. Quine's preferred alternative is to study
the evidence-theory relationship as a matter of empirical psychology-again, not as a way of analyzing
"justification," but as a way of understanding "knowledge," Le., the "theories" we construct on the
basis of meager evidence.
122. For an overview of some relevant results, see Stephen P. Stich, Could Man Be an Irrational
Animal?, 64 SYNTHP-SE 115, 116-20 (1985), reprinted in NATURALIZING EPISTEMOLOGY, supra note
114.
123. Cf. infra note 172 and accompanying text (discussing pragmatism and "Neurath's boat").
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find, I shall argue, analogues of both steps in the Realists' approach to the
theory of adjudication.
Theory of adjudication is concerned not with the relationship between
"evidence" and "scientific theory," but rather with the justificatory
relationship between "legal reasons" (the input, as it were) and judicial
decision (the output). Theory of adjudication tries to tell judges how they
ought to decide cases, i.e., it seeks to "ground" judicial decisionmaking in
reasons that require unique outcomes. 4  The Realists are "anti-
foundationalists" about judicial decisions in the sense that they deny that
the legal reasons justify a unique decision: the legal reasons typically
underdetermine the decision (at least in most cases actually litigated
through the stage of appellate review). More precisely, the Realists claim
that the law is rationally indeterminate in the sense that the class of legal
reasons-i.e., the class of legitimate reasons a judge may offer for a
decision-does not provide a justification for a unique outcome.'15 Just
as sensory input does not justify a unique scientific theory, so legal
reasons, according to the Realists, do not justify a unique decision.
The Realists also take the second step that Quine takes: replacement.
According to the Realist indeterminacy thesis, legal reasons underdetermine
judicial decisions, meaning that the foundationalist enterprise of theory of
adjudication is impossible. Why not replace, then, the "sterile"
foundational program of justifying one legal outcome on the basis of the
applicable legal reasons with a descriptive and explanatory account of what
input-i. e., what combination of facts and reasons-produces what output-
i.e., what judicial decision?"z  To give such an account is just to
vindicate the Core Claim of Realism. As Underhill Moore puts it at the
beginning of one of his articles: "This study lies within the province of
jurisprudence. It also lies within the field of behavioristic psychology. It
places the province within the field ... ."17 Notice how closely this
echoes Quine's idea that, "Epistemology . . . simply falls into place as a
124. I take it this last assumption about the ambitions of theory of adjudication is contested in
BURTON, supra note 4 and in Ken Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, 77 CAL. L. REV. 235 (1989). I take
up the general worry infra subsection III(B)(2)(b).
125. That the Realists think the law is "indeterminate" is, of course, quite familiar. On some of
the problems about how to formulate the Realist view about indeterminacy, see Leiter, supra note 30.
126. Such a naturalized jurisprudence would be in tension with most of modem legal philosophy,
which follows H.L.A. Hart in accepting a hermeneutic model for understanding the social world. See,
e.g., Stephen R. Perry, Interpretation and Methodology in Legal Theory, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION
97 (Andrei Marmer ed., 1995). According to this model, we do not look for lawful regularities in the
external behavior of social actors; rather, to understand social actors we must adopt their "internal"
point of view and understand, for example, what their reasons mean to them. See id. at 102-12. We
can understand the Realists as contesting whether such an approach is really more explanatorily and
predictively fruitful than their non-hermeneutic approach to the social world.
127. Moore & Callahan, supra note 56, at 1.
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chapter of psychology . . . ."' Jurisprudence-or, more precisely, the
theory of adjudication-is "naturalized" because it falls into place, for the
Realist, as a chapter of psychology (or anthropology or sociology).
Moreover, it does so for the essentially Quinean reason that the founda-
tional account of adjudication is a failure-a consequence of accepting the
Realists' famous claim that the law is indeterminate. 129
We must note immediately, however, four potential problems for this
account. First, insofar as the Realists do not claim that the law is
indeterminate in all cases, the analogy with Quine collapses. Second, the
analogy also fails insofar as theory of adjudication is not essentially a
foundationalist program. Third, even if legal reasons underdetermine the
decision, there still may be nonlegal reasons-e.g., reasons of morality or
policy-that do justify a unique decision; in which case, why think this
must be described in strictly naturalistic or "causal" terms? Fourth, even
if each of these problems is overcome, it still seems that not all of jurispru-
dence has been naturalized: for example, the Realist argument for the inde-
terminacy of law is parasitic upon a conceptual account of the criteria of
legality, i.e., of the legitimate sources of law. I take up each of these
issues in turn.
a. Global Indeterminacy.-As noted earlier, the Realists, unlike
the later writers of Critical Legal Studies, do not claim that the law is
"globally" indeterminate: they do not claim that the class of legal reasons
fails to justify a unique outcome in all cases, but rather fails to do so
"locally," i.e., in a particular range of cases, particularly those that reach
the stage of appellate review. 30 But to concede that there is some other
range of cases where the law is determinate is just to concede that the
"foundationalist" program can be carried out for those cases: that is, we
can give an account of the unique decision justified by the applicable legal
reasons. But the possibility of foundationalism eliminates the motive for
replacement of the normative inquiry with a purely descriptive one. Thus,
it appears the analogy with Quinean Replacement Naturalism breaks down.
128. Quine, Epistemology Naturalized, supra note 11I, at 82.
129. If this account provides a philosophical pedigree for one strand in Realism, it does so, of
course, at the cost of getting the chronology all wrong: Moore's remark, for example, predates Quine's
by a quarter-century! Yet both Quine and the Realists were nurtured in a similar intellectual millieu-
one dominated by "naturalism" and, more particularly, by behaviorism in psychology. In any event,
the point of introducing Quine here is only to establish the intellectual credentials for the style of argu-
mentation we find in the Realists. The Realists depart from Quine, needless to say, on many issues-as
might many philosophers who nonetheless accept naturalism and the rejection of the analytic-synthetic
distinction. See, e.g., HOOKWAY, supra note 101, at 124 ("It is not out of the question that someone
could accept the views defended in 'Two dogmas' yet deny Quine's version of physicalism.").
130. See supra text accompanying note 31.
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The Realist may concede as much, and indeed, has no reason not to
do so. For the Realist does not call for "naturalizing" theory of adjudica-
tion in that range of cases where legal reasons are satisfactory predictors
of legal outcomes-in precisely those cases where the foundationalist pro-
gram can be carried out.' One may worry, again, about whether there
is an interesting or fruitful normative story to be told (rather than a merely
mundane one), but it suffices for the analogy with Quine that there remains
some substantial domain of cases where the foundational program cannot
be carried out, so that the case for replacement remains intact.
b. Foundationalism.-Perhaps, though, theory of adjudication-
even for "hard" cases-is not a foundationalist theory: it may aspire to
delimit the range of legal reasons that ought to be brought to bear in
deciding some legal question, but it does not seek to delimit the reasons
such that they justify a unique outcome. In that case, the fact that the
reasons underdetermine the outcome does not threaten the genuine norma-
tive ambitions of theory of adjudication.
This objection is just a variation on one of the familiar objections to
Quinean Naturalism, namely, that it wrongly infers the futility of normative
theorizing from the failure of only one sort of normative program, i.e.,
foundationalism.'32 The proper naturalistic rejoinder, as noted earlier,
is to query whether nonfoundational normative theorizing is a fruitful
undertaking. This worry is particularly vivid in the case of theory of
adjudication. If the objection under consideration is correct, then a
normative theory that specifies what the antifoundationalist concedes-
namely, that there is more than one (though not simply any) judicial deci-
sion that can be justified on the basis of the class of legal reasons-must,
in some measure, be a theory worth having. Arguably, such a theory
might be adequate to deflect the challenge to the political legitimacy of
adjudication based on the indeterminacy of law,'33 but does it provide the
normative guidance to judges we want from a theory?3 4  Does a theory
that tells judges they would be justified, on the basis of the class of legal
reasons, in deciding for the plaintiff on theory x or the defendant on theory
y-but not the plaintiff or defendant on theory z!-really provide normative
guidance for judges worth having? My lawyerly intuition is that normative
131. See infra notes 156-83 and accompanying text (discussing "Pragmatism").
132. See Kim, supra note 113, at 385-89.
133. See, e.g., BURTON, supra note 4, at 112; Kress, supra note 124, at 285-95. I adopted a
similar view in Coleman & Leiter, supra note 35, at 579-80, but I now think that part of the argument
is mistaken.
134. Consider the analogous question that the Quinean might pose to the nonfoundationalist
epistemologist: do we provide useful normative guidance to scientists when we tell them that they are
justified in accepting more than one-though not simply any-theory in light of the evidence?
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guidance like this, which underdetermines the final outcome, is not of
much value to judges or to lawyers. Indeed, if we take seriously the prag-
matic ambition of the Realists-to enable lawyers to predict what courts
will do-then formulating a nonfoundational normative theory of adjudica-
tion will be inadequate, precisely because it provides the lawyer with
insufficient tools for predicting the actual decision in the case at hand.'35
c. Nonlegal Reasons.-Yet even the Realists concede that judges
decide for reasons; it is just that they do not decide for reasons of law,
which are indeterminate. For example, in the context of commercial
disputes, some of the Realists claim that what judges try to do is enforce
the norms of commercial practice: the norms of commercial practice pro-
vide reasons for deciding one way rather than another. 36 Even granting
the truth of antifoundationalism regarding legal reasons, then, why think
we should replace such theories with "naturalistic" ones, i.e., with descrip-
tive accounts of what "inputs" cause what "outputs"? Moreover, if we do
think such naturalistic explanations are called for in those cases that involve
consideration of nonlegal reasons, why confine naturalistic explanations
only to those cases: why not, in other words, demand a naturalistic expla-
nation of even "easy" cases, controlled- by rationally determinate legal
reasons? Put more simply, the challenge is this: why "naturalize," in the
sense of seeking deterministic causes, where reasons, legal or nonlegal,
will suffice to explain?
A Realist has at least four possible responses: 137
First: Conceding the relevance of nonlegal reasons does not obviously
defeat the naturalistic program. To give a causal explanation of decisions
in terms of reasons does require taking the normative force of the reasons
qua reasons seriously."3 So to give a causal explanation of the decision,
as the naturalist wants to do, we must attend to the rationality of the
reasons. But this is just a constraint on naturalization in the domain, not
an objection to the naturalistic program.
The difficulty with resting content with this line of response is
twofold. First, it makes "naturalistic" explanation redundant on ordinary
explanation by appeal to reasons, unless we supplement the latter with a
naturalistic account of reasons. But this suggests a second problem. For
135. Writers like Burton who do not accept Pragmatism (in my sense) as a constraint on theorizing
will, presumably, be unmoved by this objection. See BURTON, supra note 4, at 128-29.
136. As noted earlier, this descriptive claim informed Llewellyn's drafting work on Article 2 of
the UCC. See supra text accompanying notes 86-88. For a rich discussion, see White, supra note 40.
137. The discussion that follows is indebted to fruitful debates on these issues with Jules Coleman,
Joseph Raz, and Scott Shapiro.
138. For the seminal discussion, see Donald Davidson, Actions, Reasons, and Causes, 60 J. PHIL.
685 (1963), reprinted in ESSAYS ON ACTIONS AND EVENTS 3 (1980).
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presumably we could just as well "naturalize" the decision of easy cases,
where the legal reasons are determinate. The rule says, "Anyone going
faster than fifty-five miles per hour shall pay a fifty dollar fine." Newt
was clocked going faster than fifty-five miles per hour. Therefore, the
judge decides, Newt must pay the fine. No doubt we could tell a
"naturalistic" story about the normativity of the reasons that figure in this
decision-e.g., about the psychological mechanisms that make deductive
inferences possible and "intuitive" to creatures like us-but surely this
seems like a pointless exercise. Where reasons rationalize a decision
determinately, why think there is any need for a naturalistic explanation,
even if one could be given? This suggests the need for a second, more
promising, response.
Second: If we are going to invoke intuitions about whether naturalistic
explanations that do not invoke reasons as causes are more or less useful-
or "fruitful" or "needed"-than rationalizing explanations, then surely it
is an open empirical question which sorts of explanations we should prefer.
The enormous political science literature trying to correlate judicial
decisions with the background of judges is predicated on the assumption
that the former, not the latter, explanations are more interesting and more
illuminating. This literature seeks to "explain" judicial decisions without
reference to reasons, not because such reasons couldn't be given-no doubt
the Republican judges, for example, have "Republican" reasons for decid-
ing as they do-but because it is thought that the "naturalistic" explanations
here are more useful, more fruitful, and more informative than the explana-
tions in terms of reasons. 39  The Realist might concede, then, that we
could understand judicial decisions in terms of responsiveness to nonlegal
reasons, but contend that naturalistic explanations that make no reference
to reasons, but only to relevant psycho-social facts about judges, represent
the more fruitful way to go.
But whether this is true, to repeat, is an open empirical question, and
thus the Realist would do well to have additional responses.
Third: The most likely response for the Realist to make-and, indeed,
the most plausible-is to claim that even the nonlegal reasons-e.g.,
reasons of "policy" or of "morality"-are rationally indeterminate: just as
the legal reasons underdetermine the decision, so, too, do the nonlegal
139. See, e.g., Jilda M. Aliotta, Combining Judges' Attributes and Case Characteristics: An
Alternative Approach to Explaining Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 71 JUDICATURE 277 (1988);
Sheldon Goldman, Voting Behavior on the United States Courts ofAppeals Revisited, 69 AM. POL. SO.
REV. 491 (1975); Joel B. Grossman, Social Backgrounds and JudicialDecision-Making, 79 HARV. L.
REv. 1551 (1966); Stuart Nagel, Political Party Affiliation and Judges' Decisions, 55 AM. POL. SO.
REV. 843 (1961); C. Neal Tate, Personal Attribute Models of the Voting Behavior of U.S. Supreme
Court Justices: Liberalism in Civil Liberties and Economics Decisions, 1946-1978, 75 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 355 (1981).
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reasons. The fact that moral considerations are not "objective" makes it
likely that moral reasons will be indeterminate. 140 We can also under-
stand certain CLS arguments as supporting the same point about the
indeterminacy of moral and policy reasons.'4 ' If these considerations are
correct, then any explanation of the decision in terms solely of reasons,
legal or nonlegal, will necessarily be incomplete. The Realist goal is to
locate and articulate the real cause of the decision, which requires going
beyond the domain of reasons. 42
Fourth: Even where reasons are rationally determinate, there is still
work for a naturalistic story to do. Often it is interesting and
informative-rather than trivial-to understand why persons respond to the
reasons they do. Some law professors find considerations of efficiency
compelling; others respond more to reasons arising out of empathetic
engagement with the experiences of actual individuals. These differences
often track differences in character, personal style, and temperament. Of
course, if we assume that responsiveness to reasons is determined exclu-
sively by considerations of rationality, then we will be confident that
reason itself tells all there is to tell about why persons respond to particular
reasons: either they are rational or irrational. What is known as the
"Strong Programme" in the sociology of knowledge 4 3 denies this: what
passes as "rationality" itself, as much as irrationality, requires explanation
in terms of social and psychological forces. We needn't go that far,
however. It suffices to render naturalistic explanations illuminating if we
assume that there are incommensurable rational systems, so that within any
system, there are purely rational explanations for decisions, but the fact
that an agent has adopted that rational system itself requires nonrational,
naturalistic explanation. Philosophers, Nietzsche says,
... all pose as if they had discovered and reached their real
opinions through the self-development of a cold, pure, divinely
unconcerned dialectic. . . .; while at bottom it is an assumption, a
hunch, indeed a kind of "inspiration"-most often a desire of the
140. On this issue, with particular reference to Ronald Dworkin's curious writings on the subject,
see Brian Leiter, Objectivity, Morality, and Adjudication, in OBJECTIVITY IN LAW AND MORALS (Brian
Leiter ed., forthcoming 1998).
141. For an illuminating overview, see Andrew Altman, Legal Realism, Critical Legal Studies,
and Dworkin, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205 (1986).
142. The assumption here is that reasons are insufficient to cause a decision when they do not
rationally justify the decision, assuming the judges are rational. For more on this, see Leiter, supra
note 30.
143. See, e.g., BARRY BARNES, SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY (1974);
DAVID BLOOR, KNOWLEDGE AND SOCIAL IMAGERY 3-23 (1991); Barry Barnes & David Bloor,
Relativism, Rationalism and the Sociology of Knowledge, in RATIONALrrY AND RELATIVISM 21 (Martin
Hollis & Steven Lukes eds., 1982).
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heart that has been filtered and made abstract-that they defend with
reasons they have sought after the fact."4
From this Nietzscho concludes we need a two-step naturalistic explanation
of the views of a philosopher: we explain the philosophical views in terms
of the "morality" at which he "aim[s]"; but we explain the "morality" at
which he aims in terms of "the innermost drives of his nature." 45
Substitute talk of a judge's decision for the views of the philosopher, and
we quickly recognize the Frank-Hutcheson "hunch" theory of judicial
decision: we explain the decision in terms of the "hunch," and we explain
the "hunch" psychoanalytically (at least for Frank). But even the
Sociological Wing of Realism could propose that responsiveness to reasons
itself requires explanation, it is just that the relevant explanation is
sociological in character, not psychological.
d. Naturalized Jurisprudence?-Even if the Realist is successful
in defending his case for the "naturalization" of theory of adjudication (on
the Quinean model), this hardly shows that jurisprudence has been
naturalized. Recall, for example, that to make the case for Replacement
Naturalism we must make the case for antifoundationalism which, in the
legal case, is just the claim that the class of legal reasons does not justify
a unique decision-i.e., the law is "rationally" indeterminate. Y 6 But it
is impossible to formulate an argument for rational indeterminacy of law
without presupposing certain conceptual views about the criteria of legal
validity.47 When Holmes, for example, chalks up judicial decision not
to law but to a half-conscious judgment of policy,"4 he is plainly pre-
supposing that reasons of policy are not part of the "law" in the sense of
the class of legitimate recognized legal reasons. And in demonstrating the
indeterminacy of law by concentrating on indeterminacy in the interpreta-
tion of statutes and precedents, 49 Realists like Llewellyn and Radin seem
to be supposing that these exhaust the authoritative sources of law."
This means, of course, that the Realists are working with an implicit theory
of the concept of law, a theory on which the argument for indeterminacy
144. NIETZSCHE, supra note 93, at 12.
145. Id. at 14.
146. See supra text accompanying notes 111-29.
147. See generally Leiter, supra note 30.
148. See Holmes, supra note 63, at 467.
149. See, e.g., LLEWELLYN, supra note 32, at 70-76; Llewellyn, supra note 32, at 401-06
(attributing indeterminacy to conflicting canons of statutory interpretation); Max Radin, Statutory
Interpretation, 43 HARv. L. REv. 863, 869-85 (1930) (analyzing indeterminacy in statutory
interpretation); see also Leiter, supra note 16, at 268-69.
150. Llewellyn even remarks on one occasion that judges take rules "in the main from
authoritative sources (which in the case of the law are largely statutes and the decisions of the courts)."
LLEWELLYN, supra note 32, at 13.
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piggy-backs. (Indeed, in many respects they seem to hold to a fairly crude
type of legal positivism as a conceptual theory.151) But this implicit
conceptual theory is manifestly not a naturalized theory: the "concept" of
law is not illuminated or fixed by empirical inquiry in the natural and
social sciences. So it seems that there is still room for non-naturalized
jurisprudence, after all.
And so there is! But I do not see that the Realist should argue
otherwise. The Realists call for the "naturalization" of theory of
adjudication; but in so arguing, they may require traditional philosophical
help in crafting theories of the "concept" of law that analytic jurisprudents
have typically provided. Jurisprudence per se is not naturalized-just that
part of jurisprudence concerned with the theory of adjudication. For
Quine, of course, to naturalize philosophy is just to put philosophers out
of business and turn the whole affair over to empirical inquirers. But
Quine's conception of naturalization is especially radical in this regard.
Most "naturalistic" philosophers think that there remains some character-
istically philosophical work to do (e.g., conceptual analysis'53), even if
philosophical questions ultimately require naturalistic answers. 5 4  The
Realists naturalize theory of adjudication, but that still leaves convention-
ally philosophical work to be done in the broader field of
jurisprudence. 1'
C. Pragmatism
1. What is Pragmatism?-Unlike Naturalism, "Pragmatism" is surely
a familiar term to lawyers. Unfortunately, it has been so recklessly
overused in recent years that it has been rendered, by now, either utterly
151. See Leiter, supra note 16, at 268-69. I say "crude" positivism, because positivists have
historically recognized customary practices as legitimate sources of law, while the Realists often seem
to assume that law is exhausted by legislation and court decisions. See id. Of course, even this
assumption could be better defended within the contours of a positivistic theory than any of the typical
"natural law" alternatives.
152. Or it means that philosophers have to take up "[a]rmchair [empirical] learning theory," which
Quine increasingly does. HOOKWAY, supra note 101, at 55.
153. Quine's famous attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction and the factuality of "meaning"
has embarrassed a lot of philosophers out of saying openly that this is what they are doing (i.e.,
conceptual analysis or the analysis of meaning). See WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE, Two Dogmas of
Empiricism, in FROM A LOGIcAL POINT OF VIEW 20-37 (1953). But once one concedes the temporally
and perhaps culturally relative character of the concepts to be analyzed-as most contemporary philo-
sophers do, cf. Kim, supra note 97, at 592-96 (responding to Rorty)-then there is no reason to be
worried about Quine's attack.
154. This is certainly true of Alvin Goldman's program which, as noted earlier, is the paradigm
for most philosophical research in the area. See GOLDMAN, supra note 101, at 1-3.
155. Realism, as I hope to show on another occasion, needs Legal Positivism as its conceptual
theory of law.
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banal or simply empty.'56 The banality is particularly evident in discus-
sions of the "Pragmatism" of the Realists. For example, Joseph Singer
writes that:
The legal realists wanted to replace formalism with a pragmatic
attitude toward law generally. This attitude treats law as made, not
found. Law therefore is, and must be, based on human experience,
policy, and ethics, rather than formal logic. Legal principles are not
inherent in some universal, timeless logical system; they are social
constructs, designed by people in specific historical and social
contexts for specific purposes to achieve specific ends. Law and
legal reasoning are a part of the way we create our form of social
life.' 57
Although there is little to disagree with in this pleasantly innocuous
"pragmatic" attitude, one ought to worry that this is because hardly anyone
has ever disagreed with these sentiments. 158  If the Realists are
pragmatists, it had better be in a sense more interesting than this.
But what is the more interesting sense of Pragmatism? Contrary to the
impression left by much recent "jurisprudential" writing,'59 to be a
156. See, e.g., Steven D. Smith, The Pursuit of Pragmatism, 100 YALE L.J. 409 (1990); Steven
Wait, Some Problems of Pragmatic Jurisprudence, 70 TEXAS L. REV. 317 (1991) (reviewing RICHARD
A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE (1990)). For other admissions of the "banality" of
pragmatism, see Richard Rorty, The Banality of Pragmatism and the Poetry of Justice, 63 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1811, 1811-13 (1990) and Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV.
787, 814 (1989). For sturdier and more substantial accounts of pragmatism, with affinities to my own,
see Richard Warner, Why Pragmatism? The Puzzling Place of Pragmatism in Critical Theory, 1993 U.
ILL. L. REv. 535, 539-45 and Susan Haack, Pragmatism, in A COMPANION TO EPISTEMOLOGY, supra
note 107, at 351-56.
157. Singer, supra note 23, at 474. On Singer's penchant for the banal, see Warner, supra note
156, at 539-40.
158. The usual suspects-Beale and Langdell-have been unfairly slurred as "legal Platonists."
See the useful, corrective discussion in Anthony J. Sebok, Misunderstanding Positivism, 93 MICH. L.
REV. 2054, 2078-90 (1995). Although I fully endorse Sebok's historical scholarship on this point, I
reject his ultimate jurisprudential conclusions, which are deeply wrongheaded: e.g., that Realism is
incompatible with Legal Positivism and that the Legal Process school is implicitly positivistic. Sebok's
mistake is to conflate a historical fact-the reckless use of "formalism" and "positivism" as inter-
changeable labels-with the philosophical claim that positivism is committed to a particular theory of
adjudication, namely formalism. The positivists specifically reject this latter claim. See H.L.A. Hart,
Analytic Jurisprudence in Mid-Twentieth Century: A Reply to Professor Bodenheimer, 105 U. PA. L.
REv. 953, 955-56 (1957).
Positivism is primarily a conceptual theory about the nature of law, while formalism is a claim
about how judges do-and ought to-decide cases. That the Realists rejected formalism as an adequate
descriptive theory of adjudication has no bearing on whether or not they were positivists! See generally
Leiter, supra note 16. Additionally, I would have thought that Vincent Wellman had demonstrated
decisively the close connections between Legal Process and Dworkin-not positivism. See Vincent A.
Wellman, Dworkin and the Legal Process Tradition: The Legacy of Hart & Sacks, 29 ARIZ. L. REV.
413 (1987). Sebok, in short, "misunderstands" positivism himself, though in ways that differ, to be
sure, from those he criticizes.
159. See, e.g., Stanley Fish, Almost Pragmatism: Richard Posner's Jurisprudence, 57 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1447, 1457-58 (1990); Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L.
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philosophical "pragmatist" is not to be a thinker who refuses to draw
distinctions, engage in abstract argument, develop a coherent point of view,
or construct theories."W "Pragmatism" 61 is, instead, characterized by
a double commitment, pertaining, on the one hand, to the enterprise of
theorizing itself, and on the other, to epistemology. The pragmatic view
of theory-construction is essentially the view expressed most famously by
Marx in the "Theses on Feuerbach": "Man must prove the truth, that is,
the reality and power, the this-sidedness of his thinking in practice. The
dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking which is isolated from
practice is a purely scholastic question." 62 In other words, theorizing
should make a difference to practice (or experience). Notice that this is
centrally a normative maxim, concerning what sort of theorizing is worth
doing. It is not a substantive metaphysical or semantic doctrine to the
effect that, e.g., theoretical claims that make no difference to practice or
experience are meaningless and without cognitive content. "The advice"
REV. 1699, 1706-07(1990); Margaret Jane Radin& Frank Michelman, Pragmatist andPoststructuralist
Critical Legal Practice, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1019, 1031-32 (1991); Pierre Schlag, Missing Pieces: A
Cognitive Approach to Law, 67 TEXAS L. REV. 1195, 1223-24 (1989).
160. See, e.g., Radin, supra note 159, at 1706 (arguing that pragmatists aren't interested in defini-
tions of concepts-like "pragmatism" or "feminism"-in terms of necessary or sufficient criteria); id.
at 1718 (stating that pragmatists do not seek any "overarching universal conception or set of principles
that could harmonize" conflicting notions); id. at 1719 (claiming that pragmatists are neither "tough-
minded," nor "tender-minded"-in William James's sense of those terms-but rather accept and
embrace both (quoting WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM 13 (1975))); id. at 1720 ("pragmatic
distinctions" are not "hard and fast"). Radin does assert that it is a "misunderstanding" of pragmatism
"to suppose that it scorns every rationalistic notion as so much jabber and 'gesticulation, that it loves
intellectual anarchy as such and prefers a sort of wolf-world absolutely unpent and wild and without
a master or a collar to any philosophic class-room product, whatsoever." Id. at 1715. This is,
unfortunately, a "misunderstanding" that Radin's discussion decidedly invites. Richard Posner, whose
account of pragmatism suffers from other defects, see generally Walt, supra note 156, does, at least,
try to mute the anti-intellectual tone of much recent legal pragmatism. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note
8, at 19.
161. The "definition" that follows is only partly stipulative. In characterizing "Pragmatism," we
have two benchmarks to go by. One is the set of views embraced by self-identified "pragmatist" philo-
sophers like Charles Peirce, William James, and John Dewey-who unfortunately disagreed more than
they agreed (though they had more in common with each other than any do with Richard Rorty). A
second is the meaning of the word "pragmatist," and its cognates, in ordinary language. Happily, the
two overlap in some measure. But as with any concept that has enjoyed wide and varied usage, the
ultimate criterion for a definition of the concept must be its contribution to fruitful theory-construction
(itself a pragmatic criterion!). For some pertinent discussion, see Haack, supra note 156, at 351-56
and Warner, supra note 156, at 539-43.
162. KARL MARX, Theses on Feuerbach, in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 107, 108 (Robert C.
Tucker ed., 1972). This, in a nutshell, is also the central point of Mark Johnston's important recent
paper, Objectivity Refigured: Pragmatism Without Verificationism, in REALITY, REPRESENTATION AND
PROJECTION (John Haldane & Crispin Wright eds., 1993). Johnston argues powerfully against the
tendency of modem so-called "pragmatists" (e.g., Hilary Putnam, Nelson Goodman, Richard Rorty)
to construe "pragmatism," instead, as a substantive view about the truth-predicate. Some difficulties
with Johnston's argument, however, are discussed in Alexander Miller, Objectivity Disfigured: Mark
Johnston's Missing Explanation Argument, 55 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL REs. 857 (1995).
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contained in the pragmatic maxim, says Mark Johnston, "comes not from
the right account of the concepts of meaning and truth, but from common
sense as it applies to cognitive labor." 63 As Johnston puts it, prag-
matism involves an "anti-speculative norm" to the effect that "it is idle to
aim at inaccessible truth."164
The pragmatic commitment in epistemology is more philosophically
substantial: namely, antifoundationalism. Antifoundationalism is a claim
about the justification of belief, to the effect that all justification is
inferential-all justification, in other words, is of the form, "we are
justified in believing X, because we can infer it from our belief Y." Since
all of our beliefs are justified only insofar as they are inferrible from other
beliefs, it follows that our beliefs do not, ultimately, rest on a "foundation"
of beliefs that are justified simpliciter, i.e., self-justified in some sense,
without depending on any other belief. How, then, do we get started in
epistemic matters? What beliefs should we start with and what norms of
justification should we embrace? The distinctive pragmatic view is that at
least some beliefs and norms must be accepted solely on the a posteriori
criterion of utility for particular human purposes. Rather than think all
acceptable beliefs must satisfy certain epistemic demands-e.g.,
"corresponding to reality," or "being warranted under ideal epistemic
conditions," or "figuring in our best scientific account of the world," or
"being inferable from some set of foundational beliefs"-the pragmatist
holds that some beliefs have to be accepted simply because they "work"
relative to various human ends.
So understood, of course, pragmatism clearly has nothing against
distinctions, definitions, coherence, abstract argument, or theoretical
edifices: it is at least an open question whether or not these tools of the
intellect are or are not useful for human purposes. Indeed, in certain
domains-e.g., scientific inquiry-it is clearly a closed question: such
intellectual tools are plainly useful for human purposes (aeronautical
engineering does not work without definitions and theories, and without
such engineering the planes neither go up nor come down where we
humans want them to). But even in ethical and social matters, it is hardly
obvious that the intellectual's tools are a pragmatic vice. To the contrary,
to eschew a self-consciously theoretical perspective, to forego a
"totalizing" critique (in favor, say, of "confront[ing] each dilemma
separately and choos[ing] the alternative that will hinder empowerment the
163. Johnston, supra note 162, at 97; see also id. at 112 ("Although the Pragmatism of John
Dewey and William James is characteristically anti-metaphysical, it nowhere needs to claim that
metaphysical statements, because neither verifiable nor falsifiable, are devoid of truth value. It is
enough that an interest in such unconstrained claims is just idle.").
164. Id. at 117.
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least and further it the most""r ) may really be a political, not
philosophical, move-an implicit endorsement of "incrementalism" against
radicalism. It may, after all, require an abstract theory to reveal the
pernicious character of incrementalism, 16 so that it is nothing more than
the self-serving palliative prattle of those invested in the status quo to
renounce "theory" in favor of dealing with "concrete problems" in partic-
ular contexts. 67 Ultimately, it is an ironic commentary on the irrele-
vance of so much of the academic Left, which talks about taking seriously
"the perspective of the oppressed," 6 ' that it should fail to notice that the
perspective of the oppressed is decidedly not pragmatic, that the oppressed
do not eschew "transcendence . . . and atemporal universality,"'69 but
rather embrace and affirm absolute and universal human rights against their
oppressors-who typically understand the meaning of pragmatism in politi-
cal practice all too well. 170
I find a certain type of pragmatism attractive-indeed, unavoidable-
but it is both more modest and more radical than the apology for fuzziness
that masquerades as pragmatism in the law journals. This pragmatism is
a relative of the type one finds in philosophers like Carnap and Quine,171
165. Radin, supra note 159, at 1704.
166. Such a theory could come in two forms. First, one could have a theoretical view of social
and historical causation that has no consequences for practice, because it reveals human actions to be
impotent. A materialist view of history like Braudel's, in which the causal determinants of human
affairs are geography, climate, and demography, arguably gives us such a picture. See FERNAND
BRAUDEL, THE STRUCTURES OF EVERYDAY LIFE 31-103 (Sian Reynolds trans., 1981). (Marx's
materialism is often suspected of entailing a similar conclusion, though Marx did not embrace this view.
See, e.g., SHLOMO AVINERI, THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT OF KARL MARX 143-44 (1968).)
Alternatively, one could have a theoretical view of social and historical causation such that incremental
changes (of the sort Radin recommends) in the service of some good (e.g., human liberation through
the abolition of race, gender, and class discrimination), turn out to make the realization of that good
less likely. Such a view is also associated with various writers in the Marxist tradition. See, e.g.,
KARL MARX, On the Jewish Question, in KARL MARX: EARLY WRITINGS, at 1 (T.B. Bottomore ed.
& trans., 1963), reprinted in THE MARX-ENGELs READER, supra note 162, at 24, 42-45. Radin's
.pragmatism" would, on this latter view of historical and social evolution, actually preclude achieve-
ment of her moral and political agenda.
167. For a stunning example of precisely this tendency towards incrementalism among self-
proclaimed "pragmatists," see Putnam, supra note 95, at 73 (claiming that a "highly flawed"
democratic method of piecemeal problem solving is justified because most people endorse such a
method as modestly successful).
168. Radin, supra note 159, at 1723.
169. Id. at 1707.
170. This point is well made in Martha C. Nussbaum, Valuing Values: A Case for Reasoned
Commitment, 6 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 197, 214 (1994) (replying to Pierre Schlag and Steven Winter).
Of course, it is tempting to argue, i la Nietzsche, that it is simply prudent (or pragmatic) of the
oppressed to employ the vocabulary of universal human rights. But even so, this would still show that,
on pragmatic grounds, there is no reason to bracket abstract, transcendent, universal theories. This
point is helpfully discussed in Eric Blumenson, Mapping the Limits of Skepticism in Law and Morals,
74 TEXAS L. REV. 523, 523 (1996).
171. See, e.g., Rudolf Carnap, Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology, in SEMANTICS AND THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 207 (Leonard Linsky ed., 1952); QUINE, supra note 153, at 20. Quine
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and that has entered the philosophical lexicon in the metaphor of
"Neurath's boat.""7  The radicalism of this pragmatism resides in its
recognition that the only possible criteria for the acceptance of epistemic
norms-norms about what to believe-are pragmatic: we must simply
accept the epistemic norms that work for us-that help us predict sensory
experience, that allow us to manipulate and control the environment
successfully, that enable us to "cope." Pragmatic criteria are, at the limit,
the only possible criteria for the acceptance of epistemic norms precisely
because we can't defend our choice of any particular epistemic norm on
epistemic grounds ad infinitum. At some point, we must reach an epi-
stemic norm for which the best we can say is, "it works."
But which norms actually work for us? Take an example: "Don't
believe in a hypothesis that figures in a non-consilient explanation of
experience" is a norm for belief-call it the "consilience" norm. A non-
consilient explanation is one that posits an explanans-the thing that does
the explaining-that seems too narrowly tailored to the explanandum-the
event to be explained."7 Here's how this consilience norm works in our
lives. Suppose while sitting at home, all the lights in the house suddenly
go out at the very same moment. What fact about the world explains this?
Explanatory hypothesis number 1:
Conspiring leprechauns have simultaneously thrown all the light
switches in the house.
By contrast, explanatory hypothesis number 2 proposes that:
There has been a general power failure, i.e., electrical current has
stopped entering the house.
Both explanatory hypotheses suppose an ontology: mischievous leprechauns
on the one hand; electricity, wires, and currents on the other. But the
appeal to leprechauns is non-consilient: it seems a gratuitous ontological
would, of course, reject Carnap's view that there is a timeless, immutable line between the "external"
questions, which receive pragmatic answers, and the "internal" questions, which don't.
172. See Otto Neurath, Protokollsatze, 3 ERKENNTNIS 204, 206 (1932). Neurath analogizes our
epistemological situation to sailors who are trying to rebuild their ship while at sea. Since they cannot
rebuild the whole ship at once-they cannot step outside the ship, as it were, and rebuild it from
scratch-they must choose to stand firm on certain planks in the ship while reconstructing others. They
will, of course, choose to stand firm on the planks that work the best-a pragmatic criterion-while
rebuilding those that are less dependable or useful or necessary. Of course, at a later date, the sailors
may choose to rebuild the planks they had stood on previously, and in so doing they will again stand
on some other planks that serve their practical needs. Our epistemic situation, for Neurath, is the
same: we necessarily stand firm on certain planks of our theoretical conception of the world-
hypotheses, epistemic norms, and the like-while evaluating other claims about the world. The planks
we choose to rest our epistemic edifice upon are just those that have worked the best for us in the past;
but nothing precludes the possibility that at some point in the future, we will rebuild those planks as
well, while relying upon a new theoretical conception.
173. On consilience, see Paul R. Thagard, The Best Explanation: Criteria for Theory Choice, 75
J. PHIL. 76, 79-85 (1978).
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posit, precisely because supposing that leprechauns exist doesn't help
explain anything else. Their existence doesn't explain our observations-
we haven't seen any-nor does it help explain the restoration of power-we
neither need to "exterminate" the leprechauns in order to retain power, nor
do we even need to turn on all the light switches they are hypothesized to
have flipped. By contrast, assuming the existence of electrical currents
proves a very fruitful ontological posit: it not only cues us to the
appropriate steps to take to restore power in the house, but it helps explain
a range of ordinary phenomena, like why the television goes off when
unplugged from the socket. Since the consilience norm favors the electric-
ity ontology over the leprechaun ontology, and since the former works
better than the latter, it appears that a good reason to accept the consilience
norm is because of its practical cash-value.
Indeed, the consilience norm-and its other relatives in a scientific
epistemology-have worked very well for us humans: they helped depop-
ulate our ontology of leprechauns and gods and ethers, and they are
foundational norms in scientific practice, a practice that sends the planes
into the sky, keeps the food from spoiling in the refrigerator, and alleviates
human suffering through modem medicine. From a philosophical
standpoint, what bears special notice is that the epistemic norms of
common sense and the epistemic norms of science are simply on a
continuum. As Quine remarks, "The scientist is indistinguishable from the
common man in his sense of evidence, except that the scientist is more
careful.""7 4 The pragmatic necessity of successfully predicting the course
of experience is central to ordinary life and to the scientific enterprise; but
this means, in turn, that the pragmatic rationale for our most basic epi-
stemic norms can be found in universal features of the human situation, for
example, the need to explain our experience with an eye to figuring out
what will happen next. Science succeeds at this better than any other
practice, and this is why Quine, unlike the antifoundationalist
postmodemists, continues to agree with the positivists that science is the
paradigm of genuine knowledge. 75
Yet the modesty of this type of pragmatism should also now be
apparent: for once we accept a framework of epistemic norms, then the
criteria for belief acceptance need not be pragmatic, except to the extent
174. W.V. QUINE, The Scope and Language of Science, in THE WAYS OF PARADOX AND OTHER
ESSAYS 215, 220 (1966). For more on these issues, see Peter Hylton, Quine's Naturalism, 19
MIDwESr STUD. PHIL. 261 (1994).
175. See, e.g., HOOKWAY, supra note 101, at 2-3. It is for this reason in particular that lumping
Quine with the postmodemists, as Dennis Patterson does, seems a mistake. See DENNIS PATTERSON,
LAW AND TRUTH 158-61 (1996) and Dennis Patterson, Postmodernism/Feminism/Law, 77 CORNELL
L. REV. 254, 270, 270-79 (1992). For more on this issue, see Brian Leiter, Why Quine Is Not a
Postmodernist, 50 SMU L. REV. 1739 (1997).
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that the epistemic norms we accept-on pragmatic grounds-themselves
embody pragmatic criteria. But it is completely consistent for the prag-
matic philosopher, in the sense being discussed here, to distinguish sharply
between, say, facts and values,176 precisely because he has accepted, on
pragmatic grounds, epistemic norms that invite this distinction."7 This
is why, for example, the great pragmatist philosopher Quine is a
thoroughly tough-minded philosopher in the Jamesian sense, and not
Radin's wishy-washy pragmatist who accepts both the "tough-minded" and
"tender-minded" philosophical virtues. 178  For Quine, the tough-minded
epistemic norms characteristic of the world-view he calls "naturalism" have
simply worked the best. 179  By pragmatic criteria, that is reason enough
to repudiate "tender-mindedness"-at least, until experience forces us to
think otherwise.
2. Pragmatism and Legal Theory. -Although the Realists do not have
worked-out epistemological views, the pragmatism we find in their writings
is analogous to the pragmatic view in epistemology and, at the same time,
reflects the basic pragmatic commitment to make theorizing relevant to
practice. The analogy, simply put, is this: just as philosophical pragmatists
hold that it is a criterion of acceptability for particular epistemic norms that
they work for us humans-e.g., by helping us predict sensory experience-
so, too, it is a criterion of acceptability for a theory of adjudication for the
Realists that it work for lawyers. "Work for lawyers," for the Realists,
means that it enables them to predict what courts will do.
It is only in this quite specific sense that I want to understand the
Realists as pragmatists. For the Realists, it is a constraint on theory-
construction in jurisprudence that such theories have practical cash-value
176. Contra Richard ThompsonFord, Facts and Values in Pragmatism and Personhood, 48 STAN.
L. REV. 217, 225 (1995) ("A characteristic feature of pragmatism is the blurring of the distinction
between facts and values.").
177. See, e.g., ALLAN GIBBARD, WISE CHOICES, APT FEELINGS: A THEORY OF NORMATIVE
JUDGMENT 105-06 (1990). This point also helps vitiate Putnam's complaint that I am a "scientific
imperialist." Putnam, supra note 95, at 70. "Scientific imperialism" implies that there is an unjustified
and unjustifiable reaching out by the epistemic norms of science-e.g., only believe in facts that figure
in the best explanation of experience-to foreign domains where they do not belong-e.g., the domain
of value. But from the Quinean perspective, this gets it all backwards: the epistemic norms of science
work-they have proved a fruitful way of coping with reality-so the burden is on the philosopher who
would abandon such norms to give us a reason why (other than the blatantly question-begging reason
that his favored properties can thereby secure a place in his ontology).
178. James's "tough-minded" philosopher is an empiricist and materialist, among other things;
James's "tender-minded" philosopher is sympathetic to rationalism, idealism, and religion. See Radin,
supra note 159, at 1712 (quoting WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM 13 (1975)).
179. That Quine's criteria for naturalism are pragmatic becomes clearest when he says that if
telepathy turned out to really work, then we would have to revise our naturalistic view of the world
accordingly. But, he adds, "[it is idle to bulwark definitions against implausible contingencies." See
W.V. QUINE, PURSUIT OF TRUTH 21, 20-21 (1990).
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by making it possible to predict what courts will do. Notice, moreover,
that there is nothing banal about this pragmatism. Indeed, in conjunction
with the Realists' Core Claim, it entails a startling conclusion: that the
dominant approach to theory of adjudication in the Anglo-American world
is based on a mistake. Under the influence of Dworkin's important
writings, analytic theory of adjudication is predicated on the assumption
that what the theory must account for is the reasons judges give in their
opinions for their decisions. Indeed, it has been one of Dworkin's consis-
tent charges against Hart's positivism that it does not describe adequately
how judges decide hard cases."s  But if the Realist Core Claim is
correct, then the construction of a theory that is descriptively adequate in
Dworkin's sense is an idle exercise: judges decide for other reasons-their
response to the facts-and not because of the legal reasons that fill their
opinions. What but a fetish for pedantry would compel one to construct
a theory around the latter impotent reasons, rather than the former effective
reasons?
The Realists' pragmatism, coupled with the truth of the Core Claim,
if it is true, would entail discarding most jurisprudential work on the theory
of adjudication. This conclusion is indeed hinted at, though not drawn, in
one of the seminal critiques of Dworkin's program, by John Mackie."'
Mackie observes that
There is a distinction-and there may be a divergence-between what
judges say they are doing, what they think they are doing, and the
most accurate objective description of what they actually are doing.
They may say and even believe that they are discovering and
applying an already existing law, they may be following procedures
which assume this as their aim, and yet they may in fact be making
new law. Such a divergence is not even improbable, because even
where new law is being made, it will seem fairer if this fact is
concealed and the decision is believed to enforce only presently
existing rights .... 12
Mackie, like a good Realist, would urge against Dworkin a descriptive
claim about what it is judges are really doing. Mackie would, in other
words, contest with Dworkin the data that the theory is supposed to
capture. For Dworkin, it is "what judges say they are doing, what they
think they are doing," " while for Mackie and the Realists it is "what
180. For discussion of this critique and possible positivist responses, see Jules L. Coleman &
Brian Leiter, Legal Positivism, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY, supra
note 16, at 250-51.
181. John Mackie, The Third Theory ofLaw, 7 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 1 (1977), reprinted in RONALD
DWORKIN AND CONTEMPORARY JURISPRUDENCE 161, 163 (Marshall Cohen ed., 1983).
182. Id. at 163.
183. For evidence that this is Dworkin's view, see DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 22, 112.
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they are actually doing" that requires theoretical explication. For the
Realist, this choice of data is easy to explain: a theory about anything else
will not be useful for lawyers. Moreover, for the reasons set out above,
such a Realist theory is necessarily naturalistic.
D. Do the Realists Deliver a Naturalized Jurisprudence?
It is well and good to talk about making jurisprudential theories con-
tinuous with empirical inquiry in the natural and social sciences, but do the
Realists really help us in this regard? Many readers may sympathize with
Richard Posner's recent observation that, "The empirical projects of the
legal realists, which not only failed but in failing gave empirical research
rather a bad name among legal academics, illustrate the futility of empirical
investigation severed from a theoretical framework."" It is, of course,
slightly ironic to hear an advocate of economics attack any group of theor-
ists for having a failed empirical research program."s  And Posner is
also plainly wrong that the failing of Realism was lack of a theoretical
framework: 8 the problem, more often, was rather adherence to a bad
184. POSNER, supra note 8, at 19. Posner continues: "Modern economics can furnish the
indispensable theoretical framework for the empirical research that the law so badly needs." Id.
185. "[E]conomic theory [is] one of the more dismal empirical failures in the history of science
." John Dupr6, Book Review, 104 PHIL. REV. 147, 151 (1995). Let us recall, for example, that
even the predictions generated from the Coase Theorem have been empirically falsified. See ROBERT
C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991). Despite all the
"empiricist" rhetoric by proponents of economics, actual empirical researchers in various areas of law
have found economic analysis distinctly indifferent to reality. The work of those we might call the
"Texas Empiricists" is particularly instructive in this regard. See, e.g., Julius G. Getman & Thomas
C. Kohler, The Common Law, Labor Law, and Reality:A Response to Professor Epstein, 92 YALE L.J.
1415, 1416 (1983) (criticizing Epstein's review of the American system of labor relations for
.comment[ing] critically ... without regard to observed actualities"); Julius G. Getman & F. Ray
Marshall, Industrial Relations in Transition: The Paper Industry Example, 102 YALE L.J. 1803, 1870-
75 (1993) (noting the inconsistency of classical economic theory with actual productivity in unionized
workplaces); Thomas 0. McGarity, The Expanded Debate Over the Future of the Regulatory State, 63
U. CHI. L. REV. 1463 (1996); Ronald J. Mann, Explaining the Pattern of Secured Credit, 110 HARV.
L. REV. 625 (1997) (criticizing the existing theories of secured lending as inadequate due to a lack of
empirical testing); Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Searching for Reorganization
Realities, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1257, 1262 (1994) (criticizing academics who apply abstract principles
of economic analysis to real-life dilemmas, noting that "authors who are not themselves empiricists
should at least take account of the empirical work that has been done"). For a balanced discussion of
the failings of economics as science, and an interesting-if contestable-philosophical account of why
that should be so, see generally ALEXANDER ROSENBERG, ECONOMICS-MATHEMATICAL POLITICS OR
SCIENCE OF DIMINISHING RETURNS? (1992). For a more substantial discussion of the problems with
economics understood as an empirical science than that offered here, see Brian Leiter, Holmes,
Economics, and Classical Realism, in THE LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR.: THE PATH OF
THE LAW AND ITS INFLUENCE (Steven J. Burton ed., forthcoming 1998).
186. The same misguided complaint has been made by others besides Posner. See, e.g.,
Williamson, supra note 25, at I ("That [Legal Realism] foundered while [law & economics] flourished
is explained in large measure by the absence of an intellectual framework for Legal Realism and the
use by law and economics of the powerful framework of neoclassical economics."). For a different,
debunking explanation of the rise of law and economics, see Leiter, supra note 9, at 385-87.HeinOnline  -- 76 Tex. L. Rev.  311 1997-1998
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theoretical framework-Watsonian behaviorism. But surely Posner is right
to speak as he does of the "empirical studies that went nowhere" " that
Realism bequeathed us.'88 In that case, why think of Realism as the
fountainhead of a naturalized jurisprudence?
The answer depends partly on what we expect from the philosophical
proponents of a naturalized jurisprudence. The Realists, as seen through
the lens of philosophical naturalism, give us arguments against much of
traditional theory of adjudication, and in favor of empirical studies. They
may not give us paradigms of good empirical studies, but perhaps we
should not look to them for that. The Realists give us the philosophical
motivation and cues for how we should proceed, even if they do not carry
off the project themselves.
Yet even this may concede too much. For contrary to Frank's skepti-
cism about predicting what judges will do, 89 it appears that lawyers
frequently are able to predict what courts will do: how else would they stay
in business, after all? But if the Realists are correct that judges decide in
accordance with the Core Claim, yet have failed to deliver (as Posner
charges) a successful scientific theory of judicial decision, then how do
lawyers predict what courts will do? To anyone who has litigated, the
answer seems plain enough: lawyers work with some degree of informal
psychological, political, and cultural knowledge about judges and courts
that constitutes what I have called elsewhere a "folk" social-scientific
theory of adjudication."9  The success of this folk theory-which is, after
all, largely coextensive with the talents of lawyers, i.e., their ability to
advise clients what to do, when to go to trial, when to settle, etc.-
constitutes the core of a naturalized jurisprudence.
We should not be misled here by the fact that in certain domains
"naturalization" is thought to require supplanting folk theories-that is,
theories that rely on our common-sense categories of belief and desire to
explain behavior.'9 ' Philosophers of many persuasions have argued that
the basic "folk" categories are compatible with a naturalistic program."9
187. POSNER, supra note 8, at 393-94.
188. The most notorious-but also, I should add, the least well conceived-is the infamous
"parking study" reported in Moore & Callahan, supra note 56, passim. For a related complaint about
Hume's naturalism, and a reply, see STROUD, supra note 120, at 223-24.
189. See FRANK, supra note 13, at 100-17.
190. See Coleman & Leiter, supra note 35, at 585.
191. See, e.g., STEPHEN P. STICH, FROM FOLK PSYCHOLOGY TO COGNITIVE SCIENCE: THE CASE
AGAINST BELIEF (1983); Paul M. Churchland, Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes,
78 J. PHIL. 67 (1981).
192. See, e.g., JERRY A. FODOR, THE LANGUAGE OF THOUGHT (1975); Terence Horgan & James
Woodward, Folk Psychology Is Here To Stay, 94 PHIL. REV. 197 (1985); JAEGWON KIM, Multiple
Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction, 52 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 1 (1992),
reprinted in SUPERVENIENCE AND MIND 309, 329-30 (1993). Note that for Kim "the scientific
possibility of, say, human psychology is a contingent fact (assuming it is a fact); it depends on the
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In any event, such an objection would be unavailable to someone like
Posner who advocates economic explanations, since such explanations are,
of course, just one way to systematize folk-psychological explanations
(though predicated on a particularly simple-minded folk psychology). 93
Recall, too, what is required for a "naturalized" jurisprudence: we
seek methodological continuity with the natural and social sciences. Folk
theories plainly satisfy this demand: they are predicated on empirical
observation of judicial decisions; they seek causal explanations for these
decisions, inasmuch as they understand "reasons" as "causes"; and they
look for regular, law-like-ideally lawful-patterns of decision. Indeed, it
is common in the extensive political science literature on judicial behavior
to correctly identify Realism with precisely such a naturalistic research
program.' 94 That lawyers possess workable, if informal, folk theories of
judicial decision serves to vindicate and instantiate Realism's naturalistic
program.
Of course, the folk theories of adjudication that lawyers employ all the
time seem to lack the systematicity characteristic of genuine scientific
theories: in particular, they fail to generate laws of judicial behavior. 95
The political science literature-which dispenses with folk psychology in
favor of seeking "lawful" correlations between the crude demographic
profiles of judges and their decisions-has not been much more successful.
But if the political science literature on judicial decisionmaking has not
met with great success,"9 perhaps it is because it abandons too readily
fortunate fact that individual humans do not show huge physiological-biological differences that are
psychologically relevant." Id. at 329.
193. See Alexander Rosenberg, IfEconomics Isn't Science, WhatIs It?, 14 PHIL. F. 296, 301-03
(1983). Rosenberg's philosophical explanation for the failure of economics as science depends on the
Davidsonian argument that psychology cannot promulgate genuine causal explanations because causal
laws must be strict. The Davidsonian premise, contrary to Rosenberg, however, has been widely
contested. See, e.g., Tyler Burge, Philosophy of Language and Mind: 1950-1990, 101 PHIL. REV. 3,
35 (1992) ("I do not think it a priori true, or even clearly a heuristic principle of science or reason, that
causal relations must be backed by any particular kind of law.").
194. See, e.g., Orley Ashenfelter et al., Politics and the Judiciary: The Influence of Judicial
Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1995) ("Since the rise of legal realism, it has
been axiomatic that the background and worldview of judges influence cases."); Tracey E. George &
Lee Epstein, On the Nature of Supreme Court Decision Making, 86 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 323, 324-25
(1992) (discussing the evolution of Realism in the political science literature). George and Epstein,
however, wrongly think that the Realists utterly discounted the relevance of legal rules and reasons-no
doubt because they suppose a Frankified version of Realism. See id. at 324.
195. It is a contested topic among philosophers of science what constitutes a "law." A common
idea is that "laws" state certain necessary truths about nature. But this doesn't help too much since the
concept of "necessity" is equally hard to get a handle on. For a recent discussion and critique, see BAS
C. VAN FRAASSEN, LAWS AND SYMMETRY 15-128 (1989).
196. For one recent and pertinent discussion, see Ashenfelter et al., supra note 194, at 260-66,
277-81. Although these authors "find surprisingly little evidence that the identity of the judge hearing
a particular case influences the case's outcome," this may be because they characterize the judge's
identity in gross sociological-demographic terms: "political party, sex, race, religion, law school, and
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Frank's insight that "the personality of the judge is the pivotal factor in law
administration."'" To concede this would, of course, pull us away from
the Generality Thesis embraced by the mainstream of Realism-a thesis,
moreover, that does seem apt for the sorts of commercial law disputes on
which the Realists focused. But perhaps in areas like constitutional law-
where the issues engage the personality of the judge in special ways-we
need to reconsider the merits of Frank's approach. Of course, Frank
conjoined his insight into the importance of personality with excessive
skepticism about our capacity to attain epistemic access to the features of
personality that are causally determinative. 9 Certainly on an orthodox
conception of psychoanalytic method, we as mere observers could not hope
to get access to the deep facts about personality that determine the course
of decision. But psychoanalytic explanations are, importantly, on a con-
tinuum with ordinary folk psychological explanations,199 and as with folk
explanations, those of us living in the post-Freudian world have acquired
a similar competence to observe and explain behavior in broadly Freudian
terms. Perhaps, then, Frank's skepticism is unwarranted. Indeed, judicial
opinions are a rich repository of material for the armchair "folk"
psychoanalyst. Surely, for example, the astonishing rigidity of Justice
Scalia's constitutional jurisprudence, especially his fear of "unconstrained"
judgment2ff or Justice Thomas's almost pathological incapacity for-or
unwillingness to engage-empathetic feelings,2"' both cry out for psycho-
analytic explanations. If the Sociological Wing of Realism describes the
right program of research for understanding the area of commercial law,
there may yet be reasons .to think that the Idiosyncrasy Wing-minus
Frank's skepticism-points the right way to a naturalized account of
decisionmaking in other domains.2'
E. Conclusion
The reception of Realism, like the reception of any prominent and
controversial movement, has been marked by misunderstandings. Realism
age." Id. at 260-66. Perhaps what is really needed is a more fine-grained-though of course harder
to get-account of a judge's identity.
197. FRANK, supra note 13, at 111.
198. See id.
199. For a concise articulation of this point, see Thomas Nagel, Freud's Permanent Revolution,
N.Y. REv. BOOKS, May 13, 1994, at 34, reprinted in NAGEL, supra note 98, at 26, 28-29. For a stout
defense of Freud's "science" of the mind, see David Sachs, In Fairness to Freud: A Critical Notice of
The Foundations of Psychoanalysis by Adolf Grfinbaum, 98 PHIL. REv. 349 (1989), reprinted in THE
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO FREUD 309 (Jerome Neu ed., 1991).
200. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
201. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 18 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
202. I hope to show elsewhere that this approach is, indeed, fruitful.
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was slurred as proto-fascism in the 1940s,2° suffered "Frankification"
in the 1950s and 1960s, and was "CLSified" during the 1970s and
1980s.' 5 As we approach the turn of the century, I hope we may see
Realism reborn yet again, this time as a naturalized approach to
jurisprudence. The Realists, we must remember, were very much a prod-
uct of their intellectual milieu, which was decidedly not postmodern. The
1920s and 1930s marked the heyday of "positivism" in philosophy and the
social sciences: natural science was viewed as the paradigm of all genuine
knowledge, and any discipline-from philosophy to sociology-which
wanted to attain epistemic respectability had to emulate its methods: it had
to be "naturalized."'  While philosophical "positivism" may have been
on the defensive in the 1950s and 1960s, its basic ideals-especially regard-
ing natural science as the paradigm of objective knowledge-have been suc-
cessfully defended and revived more recently.' The Realists came of
intellectual age in a positivistic and naturalistic culture, and their approach
to jurisprudential questions bears the mark of that origin. With the benefit
of philosophical advances of the last thirty years, we are finally in a
position to recognize what most jurisprudents have missed: that the Realists
were not bad legal philosophers, but rather prescient ones, philosophical
naturalists before their time.
203. See, e.g., Francis E. Lucey, Jr., Natural Law and American Legal Realism: Their Respective
Contributions to a Theory of Law in a Democratic Society, 30 GEO. L.J. 493 (1942); Ben W. Palmer,
Hobbes, Holmes, and Hitler, 31 A.B.A. J. 569 (1945).
204. See, e.g., Grant Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 70 YALE L.J. 1037, 1038
(1961) ("A judge's holding in a case is an ad hoc response to a unique state of facts, rationalized, after
the event, with a dissimulation more or less conscious, and fitted willy-nilly into the Procrustean bed
of approved doctrine. The motivations of the judicial response are buried, obscure, unconscious and-
even to the judge-unknowable.").
205. See supra notes 23-35 and accompanying text.
206. Even the Deweyan pragmatism of that era was heavily colored by Dewey's naturalism. See,
e.g., John Dewey et al., Are Naturalists Materialists?, 42 J. PHIL. 515 (1945), reprinted in AMERICAN
PHILOSOPHIC NATURALISM IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 102 (John Ryder ed., 1994); John Dewey,
Antinaturalism in Extremis, in NATURALISM AND THE HUMAN SPIRIT 1 (Yervant H. Krikorian ed.,
1944). One would not know about Dewey's naturalism, though, to look at how he figures in much
recent legal pragmatism.
207. Only the apparently widespread ignorance of recent developments in philosophy of science
since Kuhn and Feyerabend in the 1960s leaves large portions of the academy with a contrary
impression. For relevant discussion, see PHILIP KITCHER, THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE (1993) and
LARRY LAUDAN, SCIENCE AND RELATIVISM (1990). It bears noting that Quine, perhaps the most
important philosophical critic of positivism, nonetheless "remained faithful to the underlying spirit of
positivism." HOOKWAY, supra note 101, at 2.
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